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INTRODUCTION
F ew areas of American law can claim to have been shaped by aca-
demic commentary as heavily as the field of conflict of laws.'
Whether that influence has been entirely wholesome may certainly be
debated. But the influence itself is undeniable
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a general consensus pre-
vailed when it came to interstate conflict of laws-the problem of de-
termining whose law should govern when a legal controversy has ele-
ments connecting it with more than one state. That consensus, set out in
the 1934 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, entailed a set of broad and
relatively formal rules that typically assigned a given legal matter to a
given state on the basis of a single event or relationship within the
state's territory.4 The approach reflected in those rules was increasingly
criticized by academics, however, who proposed a variety of alternative
theories and methods in the years following the Restatement's publica-
tion.5 What started in the law reviews quickly spread to the case reports:
Beginning in the mid-1960s, a cascade of states abandoned the tradition-
al conflict-of-laws rules applicable to fields like contract and tort, opting
for one or more of the schemes developed by scholars. A second Re-
statement, incorporating a hybrid of the principal academic theories, was
assembled during this period, accelerating and amplifying the changes.6
Almost overnight, the seemingly stable order governing jurisdictional
allocation among states had been destroyed, thanks in large measure to a
vocal and determined group of scholars.
The doctrinal transformation instigated by the legal academy has
come to be called the "Conflicts Revolution,"7 but in some sense this is a
misnomer. If a revolution is the replacement of one regime with anoth-
2 See Peter Hay et al., Conflict of Laws 78 (5th ed. 2010) ("It is generally believed that
academic commentators have had a greater influence in the development of conflicts law
than of any other branch of American law.").
3 Cf. id. at 92 (claiming "methodology rarely drives judicial decisions" in conflicts cases).
4 See Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of the
Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1125, 1130-31, 1138-39 (2010).
5 See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979) (stating that a canvas of First
Restatement alternatives "reveals almost as many theories as there are theorists").
6 See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restate-
ment: A Mixed Blessing, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1248, 1277-78 (1997).
7 The phrase apparently originated in Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in
Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 387 (1966).
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er,8 it might be more proper to speak of the conflicts half-revolution.
Although the First Restatement was toppled as the reigning system for
resolving conflicts of law across the United States, no successor ever as-
cended to its imperial throne. Today no more than a plurality of states
purport to have adopted the Second Restatement, 9 and the Restatement is
sufficiently pliable that a simple headcount almost certainly overstates
the similarity among its nominal adherents.10 The remaining states prac-
tice a potpourri of conflicts methods drawn from different academic the-
ories." The unity that once characterized conflict of laws in the United
States has vanished, seemingly for good.
Curiously, however, consensus-and not just consensus, but the old
consensus-still prevails in one major area of conflict of laws: the rules
applicable to property questions. Under traditional conflict-of-laws doc-
trine, issues of both real and personal property law are usually resolved
under the law of the place where the property in question is located. This
principle, the so-called situs rule, continues to command nearly univer-
sal adherence, notwithstanding the upheaval that conflicts doctrine un-
derwent during the twentieth century and the diversity that characterizes
it today.' 2 By and large, the Conflicts Revolution simply never made it
to property.13
This certainly is not because of any neglect by the revolutionary van-
guard. The situs rule has been denounced as irrational, anachronistic,
crude, dishonest, and downright nefarious.14 Conflicts revolutionaries,
some already inclined to condemn the First Restatement in Freudian
8 See Concise Oxford English Dictionary 1232 (Catherine Soanes & Angus Stevenson
eds., 11 th ed. rev. 2008) (defining "revolution" as "a forcible overthrow of a government or
social order, in favour of a new system").
9 See Hay et al., supra note 2, at 72; cf. id. at 88 (noting that "classifying a state into a par-
ticular methodological camp is by no means an exact science").
'0 See Kermit Roosevelt I1, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by
Means of Language, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1821, 1869 (2005) (stating that "the Second
Restatement's application can vary so much from court to court as to virtually amount to dis-
tinct approaches").
11 For an overview, see Hay et al., supra note 2, at 78-121.
12 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Exploring the "Dismal Swamp": The Revision of Louisi-
ana's Conflicts Law on Successions, 47 La. L. Rev. 1029, 1091 (1987) ("Even after the so-
called revolution which has swept away most other rules in American conflicts law, the situs
rule continues to be taken for granted as if in the natural order of things.").
13 A few other traditional conflicts rules have also proved fairly resistant. See infra Section
V.C.
14 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
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terms, 5 intimated the situs rule was explicable only by psychoanalysis;
they derided it as the "land taboo"' 6-an epithet that seems to have out-
lived Freudian psychotherapy itself.'7 At the height of the Conflicts
Revolution, the Stanford Law Review published a four-part series of ar-
ticles criticizing the rule.' 8 Nearly half a century later, denunciations
continue to appear, the passage of time and intransigence of courts hav-
ing done little to discourage critics or erode their confidence in the rule's
defectiveness.' 9 The latest edition of the leading American conflict-of-
15 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at 396-97; see also Jerome Frank, Law and the
Modem Mind 48-57, 202-03 (1949) (describing legal perspective represented by Joseph
Beale, the First Restatement's reporter, as "legal fundamentalism" and opining that as "soci-
ety relinquishes the cruder forms of the anthropomorphic God-concept," eventually "the Law
is looked to as a substitute for the infallible Father-Judge of childhood").
16 See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds: An Inquiry into the
"Rule of Validation," 18 Okla. L. Rev. 243, 317 (1965). The phrase was coined by Albert
Ehrenzweig, see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 190 (1959), and its psychoanalytic
connotations were no accident. Ehrenzweig's general view was that "as the natural sciences
were compelled to begin anew after Copernicus and Darwin, other sciences must now begin
anew after Freud-begin to face the demands of an age which dares to look below the sur-
face of the mind," and he concluded that "[e]ven in such seemingly academic fields as con-
flicts law, a psychological inquiry into the 'land taboo' ... may produce surprising and valu-
able results." Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytical Jurisprudence: A Common Language
for Babylon, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1331, 1343, 1351 (1965) (footnote omitted). On the concept
of "taboo" in Freudian analysis, see generally Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Resem-
blances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics 30-34 (A.A. Brill trans.,
1918).
17 One leading casebook, for instance, includes a subchapter entitled simply, "The Land
Taboo." David P. Currie et al., Conflict of Laws: Cases-Comments--Questions 517 (8th
ed. 2010). On the abandonment of Freudian psychoanalysis in medical psychiatry, see Ed-
ward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac
145-81,239 (1997).
18 See Moffatt Hancock, Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of
Laws: The Disadvantages of Disingenuousness, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 38 (1967) [hereinafter
Hancock, Conceptual Devices]; Moffatt Hancock, Equitable Conversion and the Land Taboo
in Conflict of Laws, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1095, 1124-25 (1965); Moffatt Hancock, Full Faith
and Credit to Foreign Laws and Judgments in Real Property Litigation: The Supreme Court
and the Land Taboo, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1299, 1317-18 (1966); Moffatt Hancock, "In the Par-
ish of St. Mary le Bow, in the Ward of Cheap," 16 Stan. L. Rev. 561, 590, 611-12 (1964)
[hereinafter Hancock, Mary le Bow].
19 See, e.g., Hay et al., supra note 2, at 73 n.63, 77, 1289; Russell J. Weintraub, Commen-
tary on the Conflict of Laws 573-627 (6th ed. 2010); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomov-
sky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 Yale L.J. 72, 106-07 (2005); William M. Richman &
William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical Restatement of Conflicts, 75 Ind. L.J.
417, 425-27 (2000). For a sampling of earlier criticisms, see William F. Baxter, Choice of
Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15-17 (1963); Peter Hay, The Situs Rule in
European and American Conflicts Law--Comparative Notes, in Property Law and Legal
Education: Essays in Honor of John E. Cribbet 109, 109, 117 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoe-
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laws treatise, for instance, adds a new section listing reform of the situs
rule as the number one reason to commission a third conflict-of-laws re-
statement.2°
Trumpet blasts no stronger than these long ago brought the walls of
the traditional conflicts edifice tumbling down. Yet the situs rule re-
mains, a citadel of First Restatement orthodoxy amid the rubble of the
old order. Given the receptiveness to academic guidance courts have
otherwise exhibited when it comes to conflict of laws, the resilience of
the situs rule is something of a mystery. 21 The insinuation behind invo-
cations of the "land taboo" is that the rule survives as a kind of primitive
superstition: Judges have hesitated to deviate from the situs rule because
land, and, to a lesser extent, property more broadly, is a sacred and ven-
erable thing, and the laws that govern it must therefore be treated as im-
mutable.22
This is hardly a satisfying account. American property law has itself
been influenced by legal realism and similar developments. 23 In an in-
flich eds., 1988); Robert A. Sedler, Moffatt Hancock and the Conflict of Laws: An Ameri-
can-Canadian Perspective, 37 U. Toronto L.J. 62, 87-91 (1987); Symeonides, supra note 12,
at 1052-53 (1987); Robby Alden, Note, Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Con-
flicts, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 585, 585 (1987); see also supra note 18.
20 Hay et al., supra note 2, at 77; see also Richman & Reynolds, supra note 19, at 424;
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a Proposal for
Tort Conflicts), 75 Ind. L.J. 437, 443 (2000) ("The time for debunking the 'situs taboo' is
simply long overdue, and a new restatement can provide the opportunity for so doing.").2 See Alden, supra note 19, at 586 ("Inexplicably, the situs rule has survived this revolu-
tion. Why this solitary territorial rule has survived is unclear ... ").
22 See Janeen M. Carruthers, The Transfer of Property in the Conflict of Laws: Choice of
Law Rules Concerning Inter Vivos Transfers of Property 34-35, 229 (2005) (asserting the
rule is "quasi-sacred" and "quasi-religious" and that any proposal for alteration would be
"tantamount to conflicts heresy"); Weintraub, supra note 19, at 537, 573, 576, 592 (referring
to the "situs myth that has infected common law countries," discussing its "almost mystical
acceptance" by courts, attacking the view that the rule is "written in heaven," and labeling it
a "false dogma"); Symeonides, supra note 12, at 1052-53 & n.94 (noting academic efforts to
"demystify" situs rule and concluding that "tradition, or what has been aptly called a 'taboo,'
is the only explanation for [the] anomaly" of its survival); Alden, supra note 19, at 587 (con-
sidering "some ancient affinity states have for land" a possible explanation for the rule's per-
sistence); see also Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 427, 688 (1963)
(lamenting that "the magic of 'situs' as regulating the incidence of law has not been dissipat-
ed" and calling for "a new age of reason" in conflict of laws, an "area of superstition and
sorcery").
23 See Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 617, 634-38 (2009) (reviewing Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Prin-
ciples and Policies (2007)); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity & Propriety: Com-
peting Visions of Property in American Legal Thought 1776-1970, at 311-51 (1997); Mor-
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dustrial and increasingly knowledge-based economy, moreover, the sa-
cred status of land just is not what it used to be-nor, for that matter, is
the situs rule restricted to real property matters. And there is something
else worth noticing: The idea that there should be a single institutional
structure with exclusive authority to administer property-like entitle-
ments seems to develop spontaneously in areas quite far removed from
land. Internet domain names and telephone numbers, for instance, are
each in the hands of specialized bodies with exclusive jurisdiction to as-
sign them.24 Certain procedural contexts involving competing claims to a
particular asset also seem to entail what might be considered an analo-
gous sort of exclusivity.25 In fact, the situs rule has some doctrinal fea-
tures that were peculiar even before the Conflicts Revolution-it turns
out conflict of laws has always approached property in a rather unusual
way.26 Could it be that the situs rule reflects something special about
property, and not just an uncritical traditionalism?
That possibility is more plausible today than it might once have ap-
peared. In recent years, there has been renewed attention to the role
property plays within the system of basic private law and to the way
property works as an institution. 27 A central idea in much of this scholar-
ship is the effect of the "in rem" character of property rights-the fact
that property rights are said to be "good against the world., 28 These ac-
counts stress the ways that property's formal structure sets it apart from
other areas of law, the special difficulties arising from that structure, and
the characteristic responses to those problems that property law adopts.29
ton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Or-
thodoxy 145-67 (1992).
24 See infra note 221.
25 See infra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
26 See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Symposium, The New Private Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1640 (2012); Symposi-
um, New Dimensions in Property Theory, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1853 (2012).
28 See J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 25-31, 80 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 784, 787-88
(2001); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691, 1702-14
(2012); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three
Cheers for Merrill and Smith, 8 Econ J. Watch 215, 218-19 (Sept. 2011), http://econjwatch.
org/articles/two-cheers-for-the-bundle-of-sticks-metaphor-three-cheers-for-merrill-and-
smith. For more on the literature of rights in rem, see sources cited infra notes 61-64.
29 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Introduction, in Research Handbook on the Economics of
Property Law 1, 1 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) ("More recent economic
analysis of property law has begun to address what is special about property."); see also
[Vol. 100: 111
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One consequence of these developments has been an emergent challenge
to the deconstructionist view of property championed by legal realism
and in many ways still dominant in American law, in favor of older un-
derstandings-now enriched and reinforced by the lessons of both the
critics and the critics' critics.
It is time conflict-of-laws scholarship became equivalently sophisti-
cated in its contemplation of property, and as this Article will argue, a
fuller appreciation of property's structure and function offers compelling
reasons to adhere to the situs rule and the principles it instantiates.
Drawing on insights from the property theory literature and offering fur-
ther refinements of its own, this Article will show how certain peculiar
problems associated with the formal attributes of property support the
traditional situs rule. The key is exclusivity and its jurisdictional alter
ego, uniformity: Because of property's in rem structure, the prospect that
the substantive standard governing a controversy will depend upon the
forum where it is litigated creates special conceptual and practical diffi-
culties. Property uses the idea of an allocation as its central organizing
idea, and as a result, a property entitlement is meant to be secure against
the possibility of someone else holding a property entitlement that is
logically incompatible with it. This model elevates the importance of
conflict-of-laws uniformity in two ways. First, the structure of property
law produces serious coordination difficulties, particularly when it
comes to informing individual actors of their rights and obligations-
think of a title search-and these would be compounded by the legal un-
certainty non-uniform conflicts rules would produce. Second, and more
fundamentally, a regime in which different legal regimes make contra-
dictory assignments of rights in the same asset is at odds with the basic
idea of a system of allocational rights. In other words, having multiple
conflicts rules applicable to the same piece of property undermines the
concept of property itself. The situs rule is in turn justified, at least as a
general matter, because it is well-suited to facilitate uniformity in a
number of ways.
In laying out this argument, I have several goals. My immediate pur-
pose is to defend the special treatment given property questions in
American conflict-of-laws doctrine. Academic hostility to the status quo
has been overwhelming, and a response taking account of the particulars
Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in supra, Research Handbook on the Eco-
nomics of Property Law, at 148, 157-65.
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of property as a legal institution is overdue. Beyond this, however, I
hope to provide some insight into property in ways useful to scholars of
private law more generally. This Article is ultimately an exercise in what
might be called applied property theory.3 ° Conflict-of-laws questions
provide a useful window into the nature of many basic legal problems,
and property is no exception. In building and expanding upon emerging
insights in the property literature, the analysis presented here is intended
to help theorists better understand property, shedding new light on some
unexamined aspects of this great, fundamental, and still-mysterious part
of our legal system.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
situs rule and the substance of the criticisms that have been made against
it. Part II looks at the structure of property and the ways it differs from
other private law fields, developing an account of the allocational model
used to organize property law. Part III explains why property's alloca-
tional structure creates a special need for conflict-of-laws uniformity,
noting both the special information-cost and conceptual difficulties that
arise when conflicting legal standards simultaneously apply to the same
in rem entitlement. Part IV discusses the situs rule's advantages in facili-
tating uniformity and addresses concerns about the scope of the rule. Fi-
nally, Part V steps back to look at the way the in rem idea extends in
contexts outside traditional property determinations.
I. CONFLICT OF LAWS AND PROPERTY
A. The Situs Rule
The basic principle governing prescriptive jurisdiction over property
is that property questions are within the exclusive competence of the
place where property is located. This Article will refer to that high-level
principle as the "situs rule," but it should be understood that the term is
shorthand for a set of general ideas and doctrines growing out of them,
not a single legal directive equally applicable to all issues.
The situs rule has two components. Part of the rule is an ordinary
choice-of-law principle. It calls for the resolution of property questions
using the substantive law of the situs of the property in dispute. We may
call this the "first-order" component of the rule, the part of the rule that
30 Cf. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Revolt Against Intellectual Tyranny, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1411,
1411 (1986) (reviewing Moffatt Hancock, Studies in Modem Choice of Law: Torts, Insur-
ance, Land Titles (1984)) (referring to conflict of laws as "applied jurisprudence").
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determines which body of substantive law supplies the ultimate rule of
decision. Although its reach varies somewhat in different contexts, it
typically applies to a wide range of property law questions: the formali-
ties necessary to convey an interest in property, rules concerning the
kinds of interests that can be created and transmitted, requirements for
adverse possession, land use restrictions, landlord-tenant law, rules for
intestate and testate succession, priorities among secured creditors, the
creation and effect of servitudes, and so on.
Almost unique for a conflict-of-laws doctrine, the situs rule also has a
"second-order" component, in that it prescribes which jurisdiction's con-
flict-of-laws rules should be used in the first place. Ordinarily, the appli-
cable conflict-of-laws rule in a given dispute is keyed to the identity of
the forum hearing the dispute. A forum simply applies its own conflicts
rules, and since a cause of action can generally be heard in any court
where the requirements of personal jurisdiction can be satisfied, of
which there are typically at least a handful, the identity of the forum is
the name of the game. But the situs rule departs from this, offering not
only a run-of-the-mill conflict-of-laws rule, but also a kind of conflict-
of-conflict-of-laws rule. Rather than the forum's conflict-of-laws rules,
the second-order component of the situs rule effectively results in the
application of the conflicts rules of the place where the property is locat-
ed. It does this in two different ways. In its stronger form, it entails a
limitation on adjudicative jurisdiction, prohibiting the courts of any state
other than the situs from adjudicating a property dispute.3' The situs then
uses its own conflicts rules.32 In other situations, however, non-situs
courts are permitted to resolve property issues, but the second-order
component requires that they apply the situs's conflicts rules in doing so.
This maneuver, in which one state uses another's conflicts rules, is
known as "renvoi." In the context of the situs rule, it essentially tells
non-situs courts to imitate a situs court and reach whatever result they
think a situs court would reach-if the situs would apply the law of State
X, then all other courts should do the same.
31 This is primarily because a state is said to have no "in rem" jurisdiction over property
situated elsewhere. See infra notes 35 & 40; see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 87 (1971) (noting traditional policy of refusing to hear cases involving claims for
damages resulting from trespass to nonsitus property).
32 This corresponds with the notion of "hidden renvoi" (versteckte Rtickverweisung) de-
veloped in some international, particularly German, conflicts decisions. See Gerhard Kegel,
Internationales Privatrecht 252-53 (1987).
2014]
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Putting the two pieces of the rule together, the situs rule creates a re-
gime in which the situs gets to decide which state's substantive law sup-
plies the ultimate rule of decision, and the situs then ordinarily selects its
own substantive law. Thus, to give a concrete illustration, the Second
Restatement provides that:
(1) Whether a conveyance transfers an interest in land and the nature
of the interest transferred are determined by the law that would be ap-
plied by the courts of the situs.
(2) These courts would usually apply their own local [that is, substan-
tive] law in determining such questions.33
The first-order component of the situs rule is logically subordinate to the
second-order component, but since situs conflicts rules typically choose
situs property law, there is very little daylight between the two parts of
the situs rule as a practical matter.34
The situs rule is most robust where real property is concerned. It has
long been held, arguably as a matter of constitutional law, that only a si-
tus court has jurisdiction to determine title to situs land.35 When non-
situs courts do have occasion to consider questions involving situs land,
they are generally supposed to use situs conflicts rules,36 which almost
always then look to situs substantive law,37 but in some cases simply ap-
ply situs law without stopping to ask whether the situs would do the
same.
38
33 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 223 (1971).
34 The first- and second-order components of the situs rule are independent of one another,
however. On some questions, situs conflicts rules are used but situs substantive law is not.
See e.g., id. § 236 cmt. a (offering examples such as the effect of an agreement waiving
rights to inherit real property, which the situs might decide according to choice-of-law prin-
ciples for contract questions). There are also a number of situations in which states simply
apply situs substantive law without asking whether the situs would do the same. See infra
note 38. That said, since all states, including the situs, tend to select situs substantive law in
such cases, the second-order component's effects are usually achieved as a practical matter
even when it does not formally apply.
35 See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S.
106, 108 (1963); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11 (1909); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 195
(1900).
36 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 223-26, 228, 230-42, 277-82 (1971).
17 See id.
38 These seem to be situations where there is no need to apply situs conflicts rules because
there is essentially no possibility the situs would apply any law other than its own. See id.
§§ 227 (adverse possession), 229 (foreclosure validity and effect), 243 (escheat).
[Vol. 100: 111
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For chattels, the situs rule is still the basic default, although its do-
main is more qualified. Situs substantive law is used for many questions
concerning title to property, but there are some notable exceptions. 39 The
situs rule's second-order component may also be less potent where chat-
tels are concerned. The extent to which non-situs courts are deprived of
adjudicative jurisdiction over chattels is somewhat unclear.40 Renvoi is
endorsed by the Second Restatement in a number of contexts involving
personal property, 41 but somewhat fewer than with land. 42 Earlier ver-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code incorporated renvoi, but more
recent revisions have eliminated it (although largely on grounds of re-
dundancy, given universal adoption of the relevant conflicts provisions
of the Code).43
39 See Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law and Property, 26 Stetson L. Rev. 257, 271, 275
(1996) (stating that "the situs rule for personal property is often trumped by other choice-of-
law rules," most notably marital property and succession issues). For security interests in
tangible collateral, the Uniform Commercial Code uses situs law to determine whether an
interest has been perfected, the effect of the determination, and questions of priority, except
that the question whether a nonpossessory security interest has been perfected is determined
using the law of the location of the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)-(3) (2011). See also Ingrid
Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, 2001: A Code Odyssey (New Dawn for the Ar-
ticle 9 Secured Creditor), 106 Com. L.J. 105, 125-26 (2001).
40 Much litigation over chattels arises in proceedings that may not entail a determination of
interests in the chattel binding on third parties, such as an action seeking damages for con-
version, and that therefore would not be subject to jurisdictional limits. As a blackletter
statement, however, there is reason to believe that in rem (including quasi in rem) jurisdic-
tion over chattels requires "the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the forum State." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958); id. (remarking that
"[t]angible property poses no problem for the application of this rule"). See also Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 60 (1986 Revisions); Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Judgments § 43 (1982); id. § 6 cmts. c & e. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 187 (1977),
the Supreme Court concluded the due process "minimum-contacts" requirement for the ex-
ercise of adjudicative jurisdiction is not satisfied by territorial presence of property when the
property is not the subject matter of litigation and the underlying cause of action is not relat-
ed to the property. Id. at 207-09, 213. Whatever the reach of that holding, it does not speak
to the question of whether the presence of property is a necessary, as opposed to a sufficient,
condition for the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over property, either as a matter of constitu-
tional law or otherwise.
41 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 245, 248-49, 253, 255. The Sec-
ond Restatement endorses renvoi in connection with succession to personal property, but
calls for the application of the conflicts rules of the decedent's domicile, rather than the situs
of Broperty. Id. §§ 260-63, 264(2), 269, 274-75.
See, e.g., id. § 251.
43 See Hans Kuhn, Multi-State and International Secured Transactions Under Revised Ar-
ticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 Va. J. Int'l L. 1009, 1035-38 (2000).
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B. Peculiarities and Criticisms
In three significant respects, the situs rule is quite unusual as a con-
flict-of-laws principle. First, the situs rule is that rarest of breeds, an es-
sentially uniform American conflict-of-laws doctrine. Second, the situs
rule's second-order component has always marked the rule as excep-
tional: Both aspects of the second-order component-restrictions on the
adjudicative jurisdiction of non-situs courts and the use of renvoi-are
very rare in American law and were so even in the pre-Conflicts Revolu-
tion era of the First Restatement. 44 But the third and arguably most strik-
ing feature of the situs rule is its sheer persistence, for it would be hard
to imagine a clearer instance of the approach to conflict-of-laws issues
that so many states repudiated in the Conflicts Revolution.I The core criticisms of the traditional approach to conflict of laws rep-
resented by the First Restatement are essentially two-fold.45 First, the
traditional approach can produce what may seem like arbitrary results
inasmuch as the law selected to govern a given dispute usually turns on
a single territorial occurrence, without any consideration of the overall
picture of jurisdictional connections entailed by the dispute. It is black-
and-white, either/or. When the only connection between a state and a
dispute is a single "adventitious" or "fortuitous" event and all other con-
nections are with some other state, the results produced by the First Re-
statement's broad and rather metaphysical theories of jurisdictional allo-
cation may be hard to accept.4 6
Second, the traditional approach is considered defective because it is
"jurisdiction-selecting"-it decides between the laws of different states
44 See First Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 396 (1952); Hughes v.
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 609 (1951); Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 354-55
(1914); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 55-56 (1909). See also
Hay et al., supra note 2, at 162--64 ("Commentators and most of the cases, both here and in
Europe, reject the more general use of renvoi." (footnotes omitted)); William M. Richman &
David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of
Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1196, 1197-200
(1997); Alden, supra note 19, at 589.
45 There are other bases of criticism, but most of these-the First Restatement's supposed
abstraction, for instance, or the use of doctrinal "escape devices" by courts in order to avoid
unpalatable results--can be seen as either variations upon or derivative consequences of the
two more general perceived faults noted here. Richman & Riley, supra note 44, at 1198.
46 See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963) (place of tort injury is "ad-
ventitious"); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954) (place where contract was
made is "fortuitous"). See also Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 4, at 1138-45.
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without regard to their substantive content.47 The most potent challenge
to the First Restatement, the method known as governmental interest
analysis, grows out of this second critique. Interest analysis teaches that
the way to determine whether a particular law applies in a particular case
is to examine the law's purpose and determine whether that purpose is
implicated by the facts of the case.48 How does one determine whether
that purpose is implicated? According to Brainerd Currie, the method's
foremost advocate, most of the time states only have an interest in mak-
ing the benefits of their laws available to their own citizens or resi-
dents.49 Thus, for example, if one state's tort law provides a defense to
liability but that state is not the home of the defendant, the defense
should be deemed inapplicable. That the state is the place where the in-
jury occurred-the First Restatement's preferred criterion-is of no rel-
evance because that connection does not give the state an interest in
shielding defendants from liability.5°
The situs rule would thus seem to be the apotheosis of the conflicts
methodology that prompted the Conflicts Revolution.5' It entails a rule-
like, single-factor determination and it does not incorporate analysis of
the underlying policies reflected in competing state laws. These failings
are especially difficult to ignore given the breadth of the situs rule,
which uses a single conflicts inquiry for the entire category of issues
connected with interests in a given res, rather than allowing for a sepa-
rate conflict-of-laws analysis for any individual issue that happens to
arise. The situs rule quite clearly rejects the kind of sensitive, contextual
analysis demanded by conflicts reformers. And just to be clear, scholars
have not let the point go unnoticed. Indeed, it is difficult to overstate ac-
ademic hostility to the situs rule.52 It is said to be among "the most dys-
47 See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173,
173 (1933).
48 See Currie, supra note 22, at 188-89.
49 See id. at 85-86, 89, 292. See also, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Comments on Reich v. Pur-
cell, 15 UCLA L. Rev. 584, 592 (1968).
50 See, e.g., Babcock, 191 N.E.2d. at 284.
51 See Alden, supra note 19, at 586 (opining that the "situs rule leads to exactly the same
sort of unjust and inequitable decisions that led to the demise of other territorial rules").
52 The situs rule is, for example, "outdated," "simplistic," "harsh," "mechanical," "irra-
tional," and "nefarious." Alden, supra note 19, at 597-98, 617. It leads to "uncertainties and
confusion," "circuity and waste," "cumbersome procedural dance[s]," and "intellectual[]
dishonestfy]." Id. at 603, 607. Propped up by "imaginary bogies," Weintraub, supra note 19,
at 584, it is at once the "most monolithic," id. at 574, and the "least functional of all the terri-
torial rules." Russell J. Weintraub, "At Least, To Do No Harm": Does the Second Restate-
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functional of all the territorial rules,"53 the product of "mystical ac-
ceptance,54 "fixation,"55 and "taboo.
Detractors consider the fact that an item of property is located in a
particular state irrelevant to whether that state has a rational interest in
the application of its policy in many if not most cases. Thus, for exam-
ple, Russell Weintraub argues that a situs law benefitting a mortgagor of
real property over a mortgagee-a rule that a mortgage is invalid if the
mortgage instrument fails to name a specific mortgagee, say, or that
gives a mortgagor a post-foreclosure right of redemption-should not be
applied if other connections, most especially the mortgagor's residence,
are with a state that does not have such a rule. In his view, the situs's
policy favoring borrowers over creditors "is designed primarily for the
protection of situs citizens," and it would be pointless to apply it when
the borrower's home state does not offer such protection.57
ment of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard?, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1284, 1309 (1997). It is
"[f]estooned with vague sophistries" and "garnish[ed] ... with superficial, abstract argu-
ments," including "irrelevant historical considerations" and the "hoariest fallacy of legal
thinking." Hancock, Conceptual Devices, supra note 18, at 8, 10, 37. It "produces harsh and
inconvenient results," demands "needless sacrifices," "obscure[s] the real ground" on which
cases are decided, and is "quite unsuitable for a federal nation." Id. at 10, 37, 38. The rule is
"obsolete, oversimplified, and crude," it rests upon "broad and promiscuous formulas" and
"misleading maxims," and it represents a "sterile methodology" and an "intellectual tyran-
ny." Hancock, Mary le Bow, supra note 18, at 567, 625, 627. Such condemnations notwith-
standing, there have been occasional expressions of sympathy for the rule from some quar-
ters. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Private Idaho in Greenwich Village?, 115 Yale L.J. Pocket
Part 5, 8 (2005) (arguing against proposals for choice of law in property because they would
entail "the sacrifice of a state's autonomy to develop and maintain a unique legal environ-
ment"); Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law,
67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151, 1220-21 (2000) (claiming the situs rule "is not as arbitrary as the
critics suggest" because the situs state has a comparative regulatory advantage on issues like
land use and because the rule is clear).
53 Weintraub, supra note 52, at 1307.
54 Weintraub, supra note 19, at 573.
" Id. at 623.
56 See sources cited supra notes 16 & 22. See also Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at 397 & n.86
(discussing "compulsive adherence to a land taboo"); Elihu Schott & Charles Rembar, Note,
Choice of Law for Land Transactions, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1049, 1050-51 (1938) (asserting
that because of "psychological forces," the word "land" is "sacrosanct" and imbued with
"magic" and that, as a result, "it is taboo to allow a law other than the law of the land to con-
trol questions involving that land").
57 Weintraub, supra note 19, at 623.
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The situs rule has occasionally been criticized on other grounds,58 but
the basic complaint is a straightforward application of the precepts of in-
terest analysis. It is broad and seemingly indifferent to policy concerns
or context, instead preoccupied with the location of property assets with-
in a framework of simple territorial borders. As one commentator puts it,
"Property, unlike those who have interests in it, does not care about its
ownership or the marketability of its title," and the situs rule is therefore
"defective on its face because the relationships relevant for choice crite-
ria are those between sovereigns and people, not those between sover-
eigns and property."59
II. THE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY
Perhaps judicial adherence to the sort of territorialism associated with
the First Restatement is simply the relic of a more primitive legal era,
sustained by some combination of inertia, linguistic entrancement, and
fear of the unknown. But if courts really are so susceptible to such im-
pulses, it is hard to see why they have been willing to refashion conflicts
doctrine in virtually every other domain besides property. There is a
growing recognition in the private law literature that property is differ-
ent-not just a separate field marked off from other areas of law by its
subject matter, but a body of legal principles with a distinctive set of or-
ganizing ideas and forms. 60 Before dismissing the situs rule as backward
and benighted, therefore, we should consider whether the unusual way
conflict-of-laws problems involving property are handled reflects some-
thing unusual about property.
58 Some have argued it is inconvenient or inefficient to use situs law to resolve a legal is-
sue applicable to different properties in different states. See Symeon Symeonides, Louisi-
ana's Draft on Successions and Marital Property, 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 259, 264 (1987). This
is a legitimate concern, and one that the doctrine responds to in some circumstances, such as
rules for succession to personal property, which is typically governed by the law of the dece-
dent's domicile. Objections have also been raised where application of the situs rule invali-
dates attempted property transfers or otherwise appears to frustrate party expectations. See
Weintraub, supra note 19, at 623. On efforts to respond to the problem of surprise within the
confines of the general situs principle, see infra note 153.
59 Baxter, supra note 19, at 16. See also Hancock, Mary le Bow, supra note 18, at 565-66
("The soil of Texas could not feel aggrieved because its Ohio owners' testamentary power
had been limited.").60 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 358-59 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Hap-
pened]. See also generally Penner, supra note 28.
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A. The Allocational Model
The key lies in the structure of property law. Property rights differ
from rights arising in other branches of private law in ways that elevate
the need for uniform resolution of any given conflict-of-laws issue. To
understand these structural differences, it is necessary to begin with a
very basic account of what property is and does.
Recent property scholarship has stressed the importance of property's
"in rem" structure in explaining how property works and what sets it
apart from other legal fields.6' Theorists J.E. Penner, Henry Smith, and
Thomas Merrill, in particular, have sought to demonstrate that "the in
rem character of property and its consequences are vital to an under-
standing of property as a legal and economic institution. 62 These in-
sights are having a significant impact on property scholarship.63 Yet
somewhat surprisingly, the literature has thus far failed to identify with
precision what it is that makes property in rem. 64 There is considerable
61 See, e.g., Penner, supra note 28, at 29-30; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the
Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 593, 619-27 (2008); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not
Quite Property, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889, 1892 (2012); R.B. Grantham & C.E.F. Rickett,
Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event, 62 Cambridge L.J. 717, 719-47 (2003);
James Harris, Property-Rights in Rem or Wealth?, in Themes in Comparative Law 51, 52
(Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds., 2002); David Lametti, The Concept of Property: Rela-
tions Through Objects of Social Wealth, 53 U. Toronto L.J. 325, 334-45 (2003); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standard-
ization]; Merrill & Smith, supra note 28; Merrill & Smith, Happened, supra note 60, at 357-
59; Smith, supra note 28, at 1702-14. While there has been renewed emphasis on the issue
of late, the distinctly in rem character of property has long been recognized. See 2 John Aus-
tin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law 702-09, 730-40, 773-802
(Robert Campbell ed., London, J. Murray 1885); Jeremy Bentham, The Limits of Jurispru-
dence Defined 164 (Charles Warren Everett ed., 1945); John W. Salmond, The First Princi-
ples of Jurisprudence 173 (1893). See also Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property
106-24 (1988); Kenneth Campbell, On the General Nature of Property Rights, 3 King's C.
L.J. 79, 84-89 (1992); Bernard E. Jacob, The Law of Definite Elements: Land in Exception-
al Packages, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1369, 1377-79, 1393 (1982); Carole Lewis, Real Rights in
Land: A New Look at an Old Subject, 104 S. Aft. L.J. 599, 608-13 (1987); J.E. Penner, The
"Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 724-31 (1996).
62 Merrill & Smith, Happened, supra note 60, at 359; see also Penner, supra note 28, at 30.
63 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevitable Trend Toward Universally Recognizable Sig-
nals of Property Claims: An Essay for Carol Rose, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1015, 1026
(2011); Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. Tort L., no. 2, 2011, at 54; Gideon
Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 207, 223 (2011).
64 For some attempts to grapple with the meaning of in rem-ness and similar qualities of
property, see 1 Joseph H. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 66-83 (1935); Peter
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attention to the effects of in rem-ness, but far less to its content and ori-
gins.65 And because it reveals some crucial aspects of property with im-
plications for the conflict-of-laws analysis, the nature of rights in rem
requires a fuller explication.
As a description of property, the term "in rem" is best understood to
refer to two significant, and ultimately related, characteristics of proper-
ty rights: A property right concerns the use of a particular, discrete thing
or "res" and it is "good against the world." The first aspect is frequently
ignored altogether, with "in rem" essentially taken to mean simply that
the legal relationship in question somehow affects all other people.66
Thus it is common to come upon statements-made even by those who
have written about the importance of a res to a right in rem-that the en-
Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 49-50, 377-78 (1985); Penner, supra note
28, at 29-30; Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 Colum. L. Rev. 37,
39-54 (1915); Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 Yale L.J. 226,
228-30 (1921); Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 Yale L.J. 501, 509 (1924); Shalev
Ginossar, Rights In Rem---A New Approach, 14 Isr. L. Rev. 286, 287-312 (1979); Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
Yale L.J. 710, 712-13 (1917); A.M. Honord, Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against
Divesting, 34 Tul. L. Rev. 453, 453-61 (1960); Albert Kocourek, Polarized and Unpolarized
Legal Relations, 9 Ky. L.J. 131, 131 (1921); Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 322, 322 (1920); C.C. Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs (Part I), 13 Harv.
L. Rev. 537, 537-38 & n.1 (1900); A.V. Levontin, Rights in REM etc.-A Response to Pro-
fessor Ginossar, 14 Isr. L. Rev. 401, 407-08 (1979); F.K.H. Maher, The Kinds of Legal
Rights, 5 Melb. U. L. Rev. 47, 70-71 (1965); Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 780-89;
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of
Property, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 239, 293-97 (1994); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Hegel's Slaves, Black-
stone's Objects, and Hohfeld's Ghosts: A Comment on Thomas Russell's Imagery of Slave
Auctions, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 525, 529-30 (1996). On procedural and remedial usages, see
Douglas Laycock, Modem American Remedies 843-45 (2d ed. 1994).
65 In their most sustained discussion, Merrill and Smith describe rights in rem as those that
bind a large number of duty-holders and that bind duty-holders whose individual identity is
"indefinite." See Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 783-85. By indefinite, they appear to
mean that duty-holders are defined in terms of membership in some generic class, rather than
by virtue of their individual personal identity. Merrill and Smith also note three other charac-
teristics of rights in rem, though it is unclear whether these are meant to be understood as
defining features. First, rights in rem affect duty-holders not by virtue of their relationships
with the right-holder but by virtue of their relationship to a thing or other interest associated
with the right-holder (bodily security, for instance). See id. at 783-87. Second, rights in rem
are "two-way" in that all persons owe duties created by rights in rem to a large and indefinite
class of persons, inasmuch as many different people hold various in rem rights. And third,
rights in rem involve the ability to demand forbearance, rather than positive action, by some
other person or persons. Id. at 788.
66 Or even more weakly, that it casts duties on "large and indefinite classes of persons."
See Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. Tort L., no. 2, 2011,
at 6 (describing this as "one sense of 'in rem').
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titlement not to be assaulted is a "right in rem" simply because it impos-
es a duty on everyone or that the duty not to assault is a "duty in rem"
because it is owed to everyone.67 As we shall see, however, while the
concept of a res is potentially more protean than everyday usage might
suggest,68 it nevertheless has important analytical consequences and is
an essential feature of the way property entitlements are structured.69
The "good against the world" aspect of property has not been ignored,
but it has been misunderstood. It is frequently taken to mean that a prop-
erty right constrains the action of everyone who is not the right-holder.70
While it is both true and important to the institution of property that
property rights generally do entail duties to which most if not everyone
else is subject, this is nevertheless an incomplete and inadequate account
of property's global scope of application. At the heart of what makes
property "good against the world" is that a property right comes at the
expense of all other people. 71 A property right may or may not concern
the behavior of others, but it always concerns the legal entitlements of
others. The right to use common property, for example, need not entail
the imposition of any duties on anybody else. A person may be entitled
to use property but, apart from ordinary tort protection against physical
injury, have no right to demand that others refrain from interfering with
that use. Even such a naked liberty, however, affects all legal actors, ac-
tual and hypothetical, because it rules out the possibility that anyone else
has a property right obliging the commoner to keep off. Likewise, a
landowner does not have the right to exclude the whole world from her
land if her neighbors have easements giving them a right of way. Even
so, the qualified entitlement she retains affects everyone, neighbors in-
cluded: Her right to exclude all persons other than her neighbors means
no one-neither her neighbors nor anybody else-has the right to li-
cense the general public to use the right of way. Essential to what it
67 See id. at 1.
68 See infra notes 73, 83 and accompanying text. See also infra Sections V.B. and V.C.
69 See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
70 E.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 19 (2012)
("The distinction [between rights in rem and in personam] concerns who bears the duty to
respect the right. An in rem right creates duties in a large and indefinite class of oth-
ers ...").
71 Cf M. Tulli Ciceronis, 3 De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum, III. xx. § 67, at 107 (James
S. Reid trans., London, Cambridge University Press 1883) (remarking that "although the
theatre belongs to all, it is right to say that the place which each man has taken belongs to
him").
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means to say a property right is in rem, in other words, is that it leaves
no room for any other property right with conflicting content. Claims
that are mutually exclusive as a matter of fact are likewise mutually ex-
clusive as a matter of law.1
2
Recognizing the nature of property's in rem-ness is important because
it helps reveal larger aspects of how property is organized. The in rem
shape that property rights take is no accident or idiosyncrasy, as the
property literature too often makes it seem, but is instead a consequence
of the organizing concepts used to structure property law. The attributes
that make property in rem derive from the key fact that property rights
are rights of allocation or apportionment. An apportionment affects the
whole world because, whether the portion held by a given person is
large or small, the apportionment necessarily comes at the expense of
everyone else who might have held it instead. And an apportionment re-
quires that there be something to apportion, hence the res whose control
is at the heart of property law.73
This allocational structure reflects a pervasive concern, if not obses-
sion, in property law with what might be called the problem of limited-
ness. As noted above, property exists to resolve disputes over the use of
individual things. Those disputes arise because when the wishes of two
or more people concerning the use of a given thing are mutually incom-
patible, it is by definition impossible for the thing to satisfy all of their
wishes. Limitedness is one of the most elemental features of our uni-
verse, 74 and this problem of irreconcilable wishes concerning things is
72 The same can be said of the second-order issues pertaining to changes in legal relation-
ships-powers to alter relationships and immunities from alterations by others. If A has the
legal capacity unilaterally to acquire title to Blackacre, then B cannot have the legal capacity
to deny A the ability to acquire title.73 What property really does is to apportion control over the uses of things. One may say
that the true res in property law is not so much an object in the usual sense but a class of ac-
tivities, defined by their relation to such an object. Cf. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private
Law 176 (1995) (describing property entitlements as "chunks" of "moral space"). Neverthe-
less, that property is really about the allocation of control over sets of activities does not
mean that "things" in the conventional sense can be dispensed with when we talk about how
property works or what it does. The things property law uses to structure its entitlements
provide readily comprehended symbols of what would otherwise be rather complicated
packages of activities. On the advantages of using things to define property entitlements, see
infra note 83.
74 Nothing can simultaneously be X and not X. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, ch. 4,
1008b3-32 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., 4th prtg. 1975) (developing the principle of non-
contradiction and the law of the excluded middle). To be or not to be is indeed the ques-
tion--"both" is not an option.
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the manifestation of it that inspires the law of property.75 Actual, practi-
cal control over a res, what might be called control-in-fact,76 is a zero-
sum game: One person's ability to influence what is done with a thing
means that, to that extent, all others necessarily lack the ability to influ-
ence what is done with it. And the more control of a given thing be-
comes the object of multiple people's desires and the more it becomes
difficult to obtain substitutes for that control, the more the trade-off in-
herent in the universe's finite nature will generate conflict.
The law responds to this basic problem and the conflicts it generates
by creating a system of legal rules that mimics the limited nature of in-
dividual things, which is what we call the law of property. Property law
translates the concept of control observable in the external world into a
legal idea. Like control-in-fact, legal control is also a zero-sum game:
One person's right to determine the lawfulness of a particular use of a
thing comes at the expense of everyone else.77 Property takes the idea of
control, and the zero-sum principle associated with it, quite seriously. In
contract law, A can promise B that no gas station will be built on Black-
acre, promise C that a gas station will be built on Blackacre, and be con-
sidered legally obligated in both instances, with at least an obligation to
pay damages to the party whose promise is broken. But A cannot give
property rights to both B and C incorporating the respective promises
made to them. One of property's core premises is that conflicting prop-
erty rights cannot exist; any prima facie conflict must be resolved in or-
der to ascertain where property rights truly lie. In this way, property is
made to correspond to the limitations of a finite reality in a way fields
like contract are not.
75 This is related to the problem of "rivalry," but broader, at least as the term seems con-
ventionally to be understood. The problem of irreconcilable wishes and the mutually exclu-
sive nature of control rights is present even for goods considered to be largely non-rival in
character.
76 Physical control over a physical thing, for example.
77 This is not to say property is a zero-sum game from the standpoint of social welfare or
even individual well-being, only that in analytic terms any property entitlement comes at the
expense of everyone else. Cf. Laura S. Underkuffier, Property as Constitutional Myth: Utili-
ties and Dangers, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1239, 1247 (2007) ("If the law protects the enjoyment
of a particular resource by one person, then it denies the enjoyment of that same resource by
another.... In the context of finite resources, property is a zero-sum game.").
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B. Four Structural Consequences
This design has a number of follow-on consequences for the character
of property law. Four principal examples will be discussed here: its au-
thoritativeness, its complexity, its impersonal and thing-centered way of
framing entitlements, and its use of reification and other-complexity re-
ducing devices. Part III shows how each of these contributes to the need
for uniformity or otherwise supports use of the situs rule. Before exam-
ining their implications for conflict of laws, however, the nature of these
features must be understood on their own terms.
Authoritativeness. Because property is meant to account for and to
reconcile all conflicting claims upon a resource, its determinations have
a particularly authoritative quality, which may hint at the reasons for set-
ting up a system of in rem entitlements in the first place. Indeed, the
whole orientation of property seems to incline toward a kind of sturdy
dependability; in a number of ways, it appears designed to avoid produc-
ing absurd, impossible, or compromised results. Property is bottom-up:
it arranges legal rights around particular sites of human conflict, framing
entitlements in terms of actual things rather than abstract personal obli-
gations (such as A's duty to pay B $100). 78 And property is bottom-line:
it accounts for all potentially competing claims operating at that point
and awards entitlements that are reliable on their own terms, neither
overlapping with one another nor, in principle, failing to account for any
situation that might arise. 7 In a similar spirit, property law exhibits a
strong tendency to create only duties of abstention, rather than duties re-
quiring affirmative conduct-affirmative duties being more likely to
clash with other rights or otherwise turn out to be impossible to carry
out.8° The consistent theme that manifests itself again and again in prop-
erty law is definitiveness and dependability. Property seeks to supply so-
lutions to human conflict that can, as it were, be taken to the bank.8'
78 One cannot have a property right in "some acre" of land, only Blackacre, Whiteacre, or
the like. See James Y. Stem, Property's Constitution, 101 Calif L. Rev. 277, 284 (2013).
79 Property's aspirations for completeness can be seen in, for example, the idea of the "re-
siduary right," see A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (First Se-
ries) 107, 126-28 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961), and the tendency reflected in the ad coelum doc-
trine to imagine real property assets as having no vertical boundary. See also infra note 204
(discussing escheat).80 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 788-89.
81 Cf. Larissa Katz, The Concept of Ownership and the Relativity of Title, 2 Jurisprudence
191, 192 (2011) (stating that "most people think finality is an important characteristic of
ownership").
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Complexity. If authoritativeness is the upside of property's in rem
structure, complexity is the downside. The in rem nature of property
rights results in a high degree of interconnectedness, and this makes
property law an inherently complicated proposition. This complexity has
two basic dimensions, which we might think of as horizontal and verti-
cal. The horizontal side of things has to do with the operation of proper-
ty law among legal actors at any given moment in time and is a direct
consequence of the zero-sum, allocational structure of property law. In a
zero-sum system, each part is related to and has the potential to affect
every other.82 And because the domain of property is vast, there are
many parts with many potential cross-cutting effects. Property deals
with the activities of all persons; the activities with which it deals are es-
sentially all those not otherwise forbidden by law that are considered
"uses" of individual things; and the things whose uses it covers embrace,
just for starters, virtually all physical space and physical objects. The
point is that everyone's property relationships affect everyone else, in
numerous ways.
As for the vertical side of things, property is also interconnected
across time. In theory, a zero-sum principle does not demand this-
rights could be reallocated afresh every instant without regard for how
they were allocated the moment before-but for obvious reasons that is
not what happens. As a consequence, property rights are generally path-
dependent: The content of a property right and the identity of the person
who holds it are shaped by prior allocations and affect future ones.
Property, in other words, is not only a web of enormous breadth but also
a chain of at least potentially infinite length. As we shall see, the combi-
nation of these two forms of interconnectedness produces potentially
overwhelming levels of complexity for human beings attempting to nav-
igate the system.
Thing Centrism. Property law is concerned with rights to things, in
the sense of particular assets, resources, entities, or what you will-
anything we might consider a res. The zero-sum organization of proper-
ty is facilitated by property's inversion of the usual form of legal rights:
Property law puts the subject matter of the right first, and then analyzes
personal entitlements in relation to it. Rather than starting with A and B
82 Cf. Smith, supra note 28, at 1700-01 (noting that property's "modular" or "nearly de-
composable" design helps ensure that property is "not a system in which anything can in
principle relate to anything else").
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and asking what they owe each other, as other areas of law like contract
do, it starts with Blackacre and asks who has what rights in it. By fram-
ing the entitlement as a right to some particular subject matter as such,
rather than a right against a particular person, the effect on the legal po-
sition of everyone else follows fairly naturally. The thing-centered na-
ture of property law arises because the subject matter at the center of a
property entitlement is a res-or more precisely, a set of activities bear-
ing a particular relation to the res, for which the res serves as a conven-
ient symbol and a clever device for delineating the scope of a person's
entitlement.83 That is why property is the "law of things. 84
This thing-centered structure tends to depersonalize property rela-
tions. As the focal point of different property relationships, the res plac-
es a sort of conceptual barrier between different actors and provides a
common, objective benchmark that allows their relationships to be com-
pared against one another. The duties of strangers to stay off property
are owed to the office of the owner of property, and the person who ben-
efits from that duty does so by virtue of holding the office of ownership.
Duty-holder and right-holder have legal relationships to the property; the
relationship between them as persons is analyzed in terms of the rela-
tionship between their relationships.
Incidentally, this helps make property "in rem" in other senses in
which the term is used. Sometimes, for instance, the in rem character of
property law is equated with the ability to transfer rights and the related
83 This synecdoche is ingenious for a number of reasons. The use of things divides the sub-
ject matters of different entitlements in a way that covers the gamut of different activities,
helps avoid delineating entitlements in a way that would make them overlap (crucial for a
zero-sum system), tends to keep entitlements on a human scale, and supplies sufficient flexi-
bility to permit the entitlement to be extended to novel contexts, divided, combined, and
folded back on themselves. See Smith, supra note 28, at 1712-13; see also Stem, supra note
78, at 37-39 (discussing ownership of entitlements). It draws upon an intuitive, commonly
understood way to understand different sets of activities-while there are always hard cases,
in most situations even a young child can generally distinguish, first, between one thing and
another (with chattels, at least), and, second, between those activities that constitute "uses"
of the thing and those that do not. See also infra note 132; cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Property
in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1328-29 (1993) (remarking that a "four-year-old can under-
stand the convention that one does not cross a marked boundary"). Finally, at least as a first
cut, the use of things also seems to do a decent job of allowing entitlement holders to capture
the benefits of their activities while avoiding spillover effects for others.
84 See Smith, supra note 28, at 1691; see also 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *1;
Geoffrey Samuel, Roman Law and Modem Capitalism, 4 Legal Stud. 185, 192 (1984) (de-
scribing Roman law's three-part division into Obligations, Things, and Actions).
Virginia Law Review
idea that benefits and burdens run to successors." The use of a thing as
the starting point in framing property entitlements makes it easier to
conceptualize these privity-based aspects of property law. Something
similar can be said about property's propensity to impose duties upon
the world, which is so often conflated with its in rem form. Unless the
subject matter of the entitlement is described as encompassing the activi-
ties of some people and not others, an entitlement will operate upon all
others. Authority over Blackacre as such implies authority over uses of
Blackacre irrespective of the identity of the user. In theory and in prac-
tice, these two features of property associated with the idea of in rem-
ness are more contingent than the zero-sum principle, in the sense that
they are not necessary attributes of the property form, but they are nev-
ertheless both common and important and they do relate to the idea of
allocation by virtue of property's use of "things" as the starting point in
the delineation of entitlements.
Reification and Other Complexity-Reducing Devices. Because the
structure of property law is necessarily complicated, property law is
shaped by a number of strategies that serve to simplify the way the sys-
tem works and make it as manageable as possible.86 A few of these will
be discussed later, but one merits special attention at the outset because
of its impact on the basic conceptual machinery of the property system.
There is a strong tendency to reify legal relations in property law-
which adds to property's already considerable sense of thing-ness. The
individual allotment of control over a res that a property entitlement
provides, as well as the entirety of all control rights in the res, are
viewed as things themselves. In a sense one may say that the law looks
at property issues stereoscopically-from the standpoints of many dif-
ferent people-and thereby comes to see property relations in three di-
mensions.87 A property entitlement is imagined to have a kind of inde-
pendent existence and reality, with a consistent meaning from person to
person and a continuity across time. We speak as though there is such a
thing as "title" to Blackacre, which existed yesterday and will exist to-
85 Birks, supra note 64, at 49-50 (discussing "exigibility" of property entitlements as the
ability to trace proprietary rights to remote hands); see also Peter Birks, 1 English Private
Law xxxviii (2000).
86 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
871 do not mean three-dimensional in the sense used in Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-
Dimensional Property Rights, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 1075, 1076 (1997), where that description is
used to refer to three separate analytic components of property.
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morrow.88 And we imagine that what we do to title today will affect title
tomorrow, though not yesterday, endowing it with the properties of a
material object. The "bundle of sticks" metaphor commonly used by
lawyers to describe property not only suggests that property rights re-
semble physical things but that the operation of property law should be
understood as a series of seemingly physical events-the movement of
bundles between persons or of sticks between bundles.
Reification in law is often criticized,89 in many cases perhaps with
justification,0 but it is indispensable to the system of property. Perhaps
its most important benefit is that it gives property relationships the zero-
sum character of the objects they concern such that a given property
problem is accounted for by one, and only one, property right. Two dif-
ferent people cannot each be the sole owner of the same property, and
while title can be divided and dispersed, the individual fragments can
neither exceed the whole from which they derive nor fail, collectively, to
add up to it.91 Treating property rights like physical things also supports
other useful organizing principles for property disputes. The power to
transfer a property right from one person to another generally resides on-
ly with the person who currently holds the right,92 much the way a per-
son can acquire a physical thing only from the person currently in physi-
88 Karl N. Llewellyn, Wesley Hohfeld's most devoted student, sought to minimize the role
of "title" for just this reason in his work as drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code. Llew-
ellyn recognized that "[tlitle is a static concept, a something which is conceived as continu-
ing in somebody," and while such a conception was meaningful in the context of land sales,
it was generally "too blunt" to do service in the context of commercial transactions involving
chattels. Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q.
Rev. 159, 165-75 (1938); see also Linda J. Rusch, Property Concepts in the Revised U.C.C.
Articles 2 and 9 Are Alive and Well, 54 SMU L. Rev. 947, 947-48 (2001) (arguing that de-
spite the aspirations of its drafters, the Code still relies heavily on property ideas, including
the concept of title); William L. Tabac, The Unbearable Lightness of Title Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 50 Md. L. Rev. 408, 408-25 (1991) (same).
89 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum.
L. Rev. 809, 811-12 (1935); Douglas Litowitcz, Reification in Law and Legal Theory, 9 S.
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 401, 403 (2000); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin.
Econ. 305, 311 (1976).
90 As Cardozo cautioned, "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co.,
155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
91 See Honord, supra note 79, at 126-28; Stem, supra note 78, at 10-11, 23. But see J.E.
Penner, Potentiality, Actuality, and "Stick"-Theory, 8 Econ. J. Watch 274, 276-77 (2011).
92 The principle is expressed in the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non habet-no one gives
what he does not have.
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cal control of it-a rule that is both intuitive and generally consistent
with underlying normative goals like autonomy and efficiency. Like-
wise, by treating rights to things as things themselves, the law can link
property rights to the objects they concern. Thus physical possession
serves as a straightforward starting point for keeping track of property
rights in the thing possessed-as reflected in the maxim that possession
is nine points of the law.93 Reification helps counteract the tremendous
complexity of the problem property addresses, creating a relatively
straightforward conceptual structure that helps make it easier to com-
municate and understand the way allocational entitlements are ar-
ranged. 94
C. By Contrast: Tort and Contract
As may already be clear, property's allocational structure sets it apart
from other branches of private law. This is probably easiest to see by
contrast with contract law. Contract is not ordered by a zero-sum princi-
ple the way property is. One person's contractual right does not fore-
close the possibility of someone else holding a contractual right that is
incompatible on its face (as in promises to sell the same property to two
different people) or that works to its practical exclusion (as in insolven-
cy and bankruptcy). And, in contrast to the situation with property, con-
tractual obligations can and often do demand the impossible: In at least
some situations, contract law is willing to hold promisors to their word
even when they promise something they turn out to be incapable of do-
93 See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 84-85
(1985).
94 Reification has a number of other benefits. It allows potentially distinct legal relation-
ships to be treated as a single unit; much the way binding a set of sticks together makes it
possible to lift what would otherwise be an unwieldy collection with a single hand, bundling
property relations makes it possible to act upon the group in one fell swoop. See Jeremy
Waldron, "Transcendental Nonsense" and System in the Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 16, 47-52
(2000). Indeed, reification may positively encourage such agglomeration, helping to resist or
reverse the excessive diffusion of rights. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private
Property, 108 Yale L.J. 1163, 1191-94, 1197-202 (1999) (discussing the anticommons prob-
lem but expressing concern that the bundle-of-rights metaphor undermines property law's
"thing-ness"); see also Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predict-
ed from Its Past, in Property: Nomos XXII 28, 34 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1980). It becomes much easier to speak of the excessive fragmentation of property
when there is an idea of some larger object from which the fragments have been taken.
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ing.95 Where property starts with things and arranges legal relationships
around them, contract starts with pairs of persons and articulates its ob-
ligations abstractly, which explains why it is possible a person might be
bound to supply a promised good even after it turns out the good does
not exist.96 While this means contract lacks property's bottom-line au-
thoritativeness and dependability, it also means the system of contract
law lacks the formal complexity of property and therefore does not have
the same need for the kind of conceptual devices property uses to keep
track of the legal relations it administers. Contract law does not attempt
to create some all-encompassing system in which contractual entitle-
ments are made to depend on chains of prior transactions, to account for
all other contracts, or to interlink all legal actors in the world. And it
does not frame its entitlements around some abstract legal entity like "ti-
tle," whose movements through the ether must be monitored in order to
ascertain individual rights and duties.97
Tort is seemingly more similar to property in that tort obligations are
often thought of as general duties binding upon the world,98 but the re-
semblance is superficial from the standpoint of property's in rem features.
First, even if we imagine tort law as a distributional system, its distribu-
tions are uniform and therefore easy to keep track of: Everyone's tort-law
rights are the same.99 More to the point, tort law seldom encounters any-
95 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 266 illus. 9 (1979) (stating that a party
may be held liable for breach of contract for failure to deliver an electronic device meeting
contract specifications even though "it is not possible for any manufacturer, under the state
of the art" to produce such a device).
96 See id.; see also Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Sale of Non-Existent Goods: A Problem in the
Theory of Contracts, 34 Notre Dame L. Rev. 358, 358 (1959).
97 An entitlement, including a contractual right, can itself become an item of property, as
in a chose in action, but that does not mean the entitlement itself depends on such reification
in the course of its own internal operations. Ownership of rights should not be confused with
rights of ownership. See Stem, supra note 78, at 37-39.
;8 Indeed, it can be difficult to see just what the difference between tort and property is
since much of property law is made manifest through the so-called property torts. For rea-
sons of simplicity, reference to tort law in the discussion that follows should be taken as ex-
cluding property torts. A more comprehensive analysis would differentiate between tort
law's norm-creation and remedial components. See Penner, supra note 28, at 142-43.
99 Any legal policy is allocative in this sense, since one legal result forecloses another. See
Guido Calabresi & Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 38-39 (1978) (discussing trade-offs inher-
ent in socially allocative decisions); see also Kenneth Arrow, Modes of Choice, 88 Yale L.J.
436, 437 (1978) (reviewing Calabresi & Bobbitt, supra). All of law must confront this prob-
lem eventually by virtue of the legal principle of non-contradiction. See Lon L. Fuller, The
Morality of Law 65-70 (rev. ed. 1969). What distinguishes property is that the overall sys-
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thing like the serious allocational issues routinely confronted in property.
In the typical personal injury situation, it is unlikely that, instead of the
person who is harmed, it is instead some remote third party who has a
primary entitlement that the person not be injured.100 In other words, there
is no equivalent to the title search problem for tort rights. One person
whose conduct causes injury to another may or may not commit a tort by
doing so, but if causing that injury is a tort, it is clear whose rights have
been thus violated: the person who is injured. Property and tort law both
present issues concerning the scope of individual rights, but only property
routinely generates the additional and complex problem of determining
the identity of the holder of a right that, often as not, is acknowledged by
all as belonging to someone. 101 And since third-party problems are so
much less central, tort law can be much more casual in its treatment of
them in the relatively unusual circumstances in which they do arise. Simp-
ly put, tort law does not determine substantive rights according to a strict
zero-sum principle. That a tortfeasor owed a duty to a given victim does
not necessarily rule out the possibility that the defendant also owed some
contrary tort duty to someone else, at least in practice.0 2 One person's
tem of property law is structured in a way that takes this zero-sum problem into account
from the start and with relative precision.100 Although primary rights are not arranged according to a strict allocational model, zero-
sum considerations may come into play in certain remedial contexts, such as rules about re-
covery for derivative injuries, third-party standing, joint and several liability, and election of
remedies. Relatedly, remedial claims may be transferable, at which point zero-sum concerns
will come into play and problems of determining title to a claim may arise, but that is as a
result not of the internal content of the entitlement but of the property quality that emerges
when any legal entitlement is itself treated as a thing that legally belongs to someone. See
supra note 97.
101 This is so irrespective of whether one views tort law duties as "relational," in the sense
so famously debated in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). The
essential question there is whether suit can be brought against an actor whose conduct unrea-
sonably endangered one person but only caused injury to someone else. However one an-
swers that question about the nature and scope of the duty of care, there is no difficulty de-
termining who has been torted, if a tort occurred.
102 In negligence law, the fact that an actor's "only alternative is a course of conduct which
involves an equal or greater risk of harm to a third person" is only treated as "a factor" to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of the actor's conduct. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 295 (1965). Furthermore, if the risk to each potential victim is substantially
the same, "it may be that he can pursue either course without becoming negligent in so do-
ing." Id. at cmt. a.; cf. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989) (allowing suit by em-
ployees of defendant alleging unlawful discrimination against them resulting from a consent
decree between defendant and other employees).
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tort-law right, in other words, does not foreclose the possibility that some-
one else holds a conflicting right.° 3
For similar reasons, tort law does not behave as though there were
some continuously extant entitlement of the sort dealt with in property
law-tort determinations are far more bilateral and one-off. Tort law
largely operates ex post, and as a practical matter, its determinations are
often so contextual that it seems a stretch to imagine that the result in a
given case reveals the way entitlements were distributed between the
parties all along or will continue to be distributed going forward.' 4 That,
after all, is why so many tort questions are submitted to juries-because
they are not questions of law. Indeed, determining whether A owes B a
duty of care in one case might not establish the rights and obligations of
the same parties in future cases involving similar conduct but arising out
of new accidents and injuries. In short, tort does not involve the same
third-party allocational questions at issue in property, and it therefore
does not insist on the sort of precision in determining individual issues
of entitlement that gives property relations such consistency of effect
across time and against different persons.
III. PROPERTY AND UNIFORMITY
Situs rule critics have focused their attention on the issue of what
might be called the intrinsic merits of using situs law. They have at-
tacked old-fashioned suggestions that the place where property is locat-
ed enjoys some sort of natural supremacy deducible from postulates
about the nature of sovereignty. 10 5 And they have attempted to demon-
103 The preference for after-the-fact liability rule-protection, see Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Ca-
thedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1972), helps tort law escape any possible zero-sum
constraints. Since tort law almost always operates ex post, there is little danger that the law
will actually issue conflicting commands to a defendant by way of a preventative injunction.
In addition, because the dispute is over what the defendant should have done, not what the
defendant should do, third-party interests may tend to appear more speculative, thereby ob-
scuring the possibility of conflict.
104 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1187, 1191
(2001) ("No matter how negligence is defined in instructions to the jury, or in the law ap-
plied by a judge in a bench trial, the negligence standard is abstract and general. Within wide
bounds, the finder of fact does not identify a pre-existing norm, but simultaneously deter-
mines for itself what would constitute reasonable behavior under the circumstances and then
applies this norm to the situation at hand.").
0 They had much grist for their mills. See, e.g., Hughes v. Winkleman, 147 S.W. 994,
996 (Mo. 1912) (declaring that a state's property law "has no extraterritorial force, but dies
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strate that the location of property is usually unrelated to the policies at
issue in property disputes. Even if the situs of property lacks any intrin-
sic superiority, however, the use of situs law is not necessarily unjusti-
fied. Another possibility is that the rule makes sense in light of uniformi-
ty considerations-meaning that it is important that the same legal
standard be used to resolve a given issue, regardless of the forum in
which it is litigated, and that the situs rule is somehow important to pro-
ducing such uniformity.
This is a very different way to look at the problem. If all we ask is
whether as a matter of first principles the situs state is the only state
competent to decide a property issue in some intrinsic sense, we over-
look the possibility that uniformity is required but that in theory there is
no barrier to the choice of any one of a number of candidates as the
source of the law uniformly to be selected. The issue can be analogized
to the problem of deciding whether the law should require drivers to
drive on the left or the right. That neither side is inherently superior to
the other cannot be the end of the inquiry-the fact that any particular
choice is arbitrary does not mean the fact of making a choice, whatever
its content may be, is equally unprincipled. Indeed, a universal right-side
rule might be preferable even if driving on the right would often be
worse than driving on the left. 10 6
Approached in this way, the situs rule may be justified if the need for
uniformity is greater than the value of selecting the legal standard most
appropriate when the case is viewed in isolation and if the situs rule does
a comparatively better job of ensuring the desired uniformity. Uniformi-
ty is linked to exclusivity-uniformity is the state of affairs produced by
a system in which there is a single, exclusive legal standard governing a
particular issue. Traditional conflict-of-laws theorists started from a
premise of jurisdictional exclusivity and sought to derive the situs rule
from it, while the rule's more recent detractors have rejected the situs
rule because they have rejected the premise of territorial exclusivity, at
at the state boundary, as the trees about Troy, under the mandate of the gods, grew no higher
than the walls"); Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 6 Eng. Rep. 1270 (H.L. 1835) (stating that a rule af-
fecting title to property "is sown in the land, springs out of it, and cannot, according to the
law of England, be abrogated or destroyed by any foreign rule or law whatsoever").
106 Suppose, for instance, drivers are less likely to litter when they drive on the side of the
road corresponding to their dominant hand, making the right side superior for right-handed
drivers but the left side superior for left-handed ones, or that it is too costly to determine
which is the optimal side, or that a rule requiring people to drive on the side which is theoret-
ically not the most optimal would nevertheless achieve greater rates of compliance.
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least as traditionally understood. But the benefits of uniformity suggest
exclusivity may be more fruitfully understood as a conclusion than as a
starting point-if uniformity is required, then so is exclusivity. They are
flip-sides of the same coin.
To be sure, in seeking to understand how situs exclusivity might be
warranted in a post-Conflicts Revolution world, something more will be
needed than a citation to virtues typically associated with uniformity like
predictability and the avoidance of forum-shopping. These are also ben-
eficial for fields like contract and tort that were nonetheless "revolution-
ized" without much handwringing.' °7 But the allocational structure of
property law points the way, suggesting two basic reasons why uni-
formity of result, whatever its benefits as a general matter, is particularly
valuable when it comes to property.
A. Information and Coordination
The first is of an immediately practical cast. The allocational structure
of property law and its associated complexity entails potentially dra-
matic communication obstacles and information costs. Uniformity is
therefore needed because without it, these special difficulties would be
aggravated.
For a start, the interdependence hardwired into the structure of prop-
erty law leaves property less able to absorb the additional uncertainty
and confusion that a system of overlapping jurisdiction would entail.
The horizontal connectedness that the system of property law entails-
the way it creates a network of legal relationships between all people-
is one major source of complexity. When every entitlement comes at the
expense of any person who is not the entitlement holder, the steps need-
ed to transmit the content of each entitlement-who has rights in what,
requiring others to act how, obtainable by whom-are potentially over-
whelming. A system in which multiple, conflicting legal regimes simul-
taneously applied to the same property question would increase these
problems significantly.
Uniformity is also of elevated importance because of property's verti-
cal complexity-its temporal interconnectedness or path-dependence.
The difficulties arising under a system of overlapping jurisdiction can be
especially costly for property because property is set up in a way that
tends to make more information relevant to the legal rights it creates
107 See Alden, supra note 19, at 597.
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than is true for other areas of law. 0 8 The validity of a contract or the ex-
istence of a tort-law duty of care usually does not depend upon an evalu-
ation of a series of prior contractual relationships or tort duties. But with
property, each link in the chain of title often must be examined: At least
in principle, every prior conveyance of the same property needs to have
been valid and there must not have been any event at any point along the
way that divested title so as to forge new links leading elsewhere.'0 9 This
structure means there are more moving parts, which means more oppor-
tunities for something to go wrong, which means more uncertainty and
higher information costs. In a system where different conflict-of-laws
systems lead to different rules of decision in different courts, it becomes
impossible to know what legal standard will govern a particular transac-
tion until litigation commences. And if the true allocation of property
rights at any given point can be determined only through litigation, it
becomes necessary to litigate after every transaction to have assurance
that the chain of title is complete,10 an expensive proposition to say the
least."'
But that is only the beginning, for the difficulties of coordination and
information transmission multiply significantly with the combination of
these two sources of complexity, vertical and horizontal. The position of
buyer and seller depends on the status and actions of earlier buyers and
sellers-not to mention creditors, co-tenants, lienholders, spouses, cetuis
que trust, remaindermen, squatters, tenants, bailors, heirs, and others
108 Cf. Smith, supra note 28, at 1703-08. The problems faced in contract and tort prompt
legal responses that are naturally more "decomposable" than the system property law estab-
lishes.
10 There are important property principles that help mitigate these difficulties-adverse
possession, negotiability, recordation procedures, good-faith purchaser rules, and similar de-
vices for cutting off prior claims. But the chain-of-title arrangement is property's default po-
sition, and even when these devices do come into play, they by no means eliminate the inter-
temporal dimension of property law.
Ilt The Torrens system can be seen as an attempt to do just this, but more efficiently. See
J.V. Brown II, Yes Virginia-There Is a Torrens Act, 9 U. Rich. L. Rev. 301, 303 (1975)
("In order to register a title under the Torrens Act, a judicial proceeding is held to determine
the true holders of interest in the land, a proceeding very much in the nature of a suit to quiet
title. Once this proceeding in rem is concluded, the Torrens law 'clears [the] title and quiets
it against all the world."' (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)). Negotiability reflects a sim-
ilar impulse.
111 See also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and
Anticommons, 43 J.L. & Econ. 1, 11-12 (2000); cf. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of
Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 18-28 (2000)
(describing problems associated with proliferation of regulatory control over assets).
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having at some point had some legal claim upon the property-persons
with whom the current parties may have had no contact or relationship
and who often have no stake in the current dispute. A person seeking to
verify her title to Blackacre not only must concern herself with a series
of prior legal events, potentially stretching well into the past, but she
must do so notwithstanding her own lack of involvement in those
events, the likelihood that those whose conduct is relevant have no inter-
est in assisting her, and indeed the possibility that those persons are im-
possible to locate or just plain dead. Property holders, potential purchas-
ers, creditors, courts, title examiners, insurers, and record keepers may
all find themselves dragged into these complicated inquiries. Again, as-
certaining a person's rights in contract or tort generally does not depend
on formal complexities of this kind.112 So while uniformity might be
beneficial in those fields, it is more obviously essential when it comes to
property.
Nor is the problem simply that non-uniformity magnifies the special
problems property law faces; equally significant, non-uniformity also
upsets the various institutional strategies property law incorporates to
mitigate these problems. As Tom Merrill and Henry Smith have shown,
property law embraces a number of strategies designed to reduce the
impact of this essential complexity. These include heavy reliance on
rules that are both broad in scope and bright-line in definition;"13 a relat-
ed tendency to standardize legal forms and resist customization of indi-
vidual legal entitlements;" 4 the use of disclosure requirements and in-
centives, often accompanied by special mechanisms like recordation
systems and other more indirect practices for supplying the requisite no-
tification;" 5 and a "modular" organization that compartmentalizes legal
relationships and thereby limits the information relevant to different ac-
tors in different contexts." 6 The need for uniformity in conflict of laws
follows from these strategies quite naturally. A bright-line rule is less
bright-line when it cannot be determined when the rule will and will not
apply. The benefits of having only a limited menu of standardized legal
112 Contract, tort, and other fields certainly can give rise to complicated inquiries, but the
difficulties do not generally have the same structural aspect. Property's interconnected com-
plexities are sewn into its basic fabric.
113 Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 778-79.
114 Id. at 776.
"' Id. at 805-06.




forms are undercut by the existence of multiple, competing menus. It is
harder to give or receive effective notice in the face of uncertain legal
standards and multiple notice mechanisms.117 And a modular system, de-
signed to combat complexity by clustering individual items together into
separate units with simplified and standardized interfaces, calls for a
common protocol to determine how those clusters are to be formed." 8
And just as non-uniformity causes problems for institutional tech-
niques used in property law to reduce complexity and combat infor-
mation costs, those same institutional techniques can multiply the prob-
lems associated with non-uniformity. For example, at least for the kinds
of issues covered by default rules, parties can avoid having to learn the
content of a state's contract law; so long as they are explicit, parties can
specify any combination of rights and duties they like or include a
choice-of-law provision selecting their preferred legal regime for the
resolution of ambiguities. 19 But much of property law takes the form of
mandatory rules that cannot be altered by the parties to a particular
transaction, whether directly 120 or through choice-of-law mechanisms,'
2
'
making it necessary to find out what the rules actually are in order to sat-
isfy them. In addition, conflicts questions can be more acute for property
because property law often entails greater procedural and technical for-
mality. The steps necessary to create a legally binding contract for the
provision of $1 million in services, for example, will generally prove
less elaborate and particular than those necessary to transfer title to a
$50,000 plot of land. 122 This has significant effects on the conflict-of-
117 See U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 4 (2001) ("[P]arties taking a security interest or asked to ex-
tend credit which may be subject to a security interest must have sure ways to find out
whether and where to file and where to look for possible existing filings.").
"' See Martin C. Libicki, Standards: The Rough Road to the Common Byte, in Standards
Policy for Information Infrastructure 35, 37 (Brian Kahin & Janet Abbate eds., 1995); see
also Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications
Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 Fed. Comm. L.J. 587,
602-03 (2004).
u9 Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 187 (1971).
120 For example, the numerus clausus principle; see Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardiza-
tion, supra note 61, at 9-24.
121 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 19, at 78 (lamenting that "[o]ne may not, for ex-
ample, create a chattel in California, but specify that it will be governed by the property law
of Wyoming").
122 For example, most contracts need not be in writing, but the statute of frauds excepts
contracts for the sale of real property or goods worth more than $500. See Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 805-09. (Tex. App. 1987) (handshake contract for sale of
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laws problem. In tort and contracts situations, actors may be able cope
with uncertainty by adopting a belt-and-suspenders approach and com-
plying with every legal standard that might plausibly be applied. Such a
strategy is more likely to prove unworkable with property, however, be-
cause of the costlier formalities it entails.
B. Allocations and Allocators
These immediately practical concerns are serious enough by them-
selves but there is another, arguably more fundamental, difficulty. A
system of overlapping property jurisdiction is at odds with the conceptu-
al structure of property and the techniques we use to communicate,
comprehend, and organize property relationships. As discussed, property
aspires to a kind of authoritativeness and completeness in a way other
areas of law do not. Its in rem structure represents an attempt to account
for all possible claims upon a given resource and to determine their pri-
ority against each other. Property is designed to have the last word, de-
scribing a bottom-line state of legal rights-in this sense perhaps corre-
sponding with what civil lawyers call "absolute," as opposed to
"relative," entitlements. 123
The possibility of more than one operative system of property law,
applicable to the same issue concerning the same resource, undermines
that basic idea. Under one property regime, A might be the owner of
Blackacre while under another equally valid and applicable regime, the
owner might be B. Property's ambitions to offer a complete and reliable
account of legal rights in a resource are thwarted by a conflict-of-laws
regime that imagines two sovereigns with concurrent jurisdiction over
the same property dispute, capable of propounding different rules and
making different determinations of property rights holding. Conflict of
laws, backed up by the law of preclusion and judgments, supplants
property as the mechanism for sifting through conflicting claims. A sys-
tem of universally exclusive entitlements-one in which each entitle-
ment precludes the possibility that anyone else has an equivalent and
multi-billion-dollar Getty Oil Company held enforceable); U.C.C. § 2-201; Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 110 (1971).
123 See Honor6, supra note 64, at 453-54, 458-62; cf. Mauro Bussani, Vernon Valentine
Palmer & Francesco Parisi, Liability for Pure Financial Loss in Europe: An Economic Re-
statement, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 113, 125-26 (2003) (discussing the distinction between abso-
lute and relative rights based on whether "the right is over a 'thing' as opposed to a right
whose object "has as its focal point an expectation over somebody else's behavior").
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conflicting entitlement-faces a profound challenge in the absence of an
exclusive system of rules for its internal ordering.
Concurrent, conflicting, prescriptive jurisdiction also interferes with
conceptual devices like reification used to organize property law. As
discussed, property depends on the idea that there is somehow a "there
there," a legal status that is as much an attribute of the res in question as
it is of any person affected by it. Yet to say explicitly that the law deter-
mining the owner of Blackacre formally depends on the forum in which
the question is litigated seems to imply one of two things: Either there is
no owner until litigation commences or there are two owners simultane-
ously, with the choice of forum effectively extinguishing the claims of
one or the other when judgment is entered. Both ideas are in tension
with the zero-sum-game quality of property law and the way property
law promotes it by reifying property status. With respect to the former,
property law abhors a vacuum-in principle, property law imagines title
is always somewhere, even if the location is uncertain-so the idea that
there simply is no owner until a forum is chosen is hard to square with
the premises of the underlying substantive law.'24 As to the latter, prop-
erty rights are exclusive by their definition, and undivided title to prop-
erty cannot be in two places at the same time. When conflicting property
systems apply simultaneously, the legal "object" that serves as the or-
ganizing focus of analysis loses its objectivity and seeming reality.
The point can also be seen from the other way around, by looking at
the challenges property poses to a system of overlapping, non-exclusive
jurisdiction. There is something troubling about the idea that different
tribunals would use different legal standards to resolve the same dis-
pute-not, or not only, because it may lead to undesirable forum-
shopping, but because adjudication purports to supply an authoritative
determination of the merits of a legal dispute, an idea that becomes less
124 See, e.g., James C. Roberton, Abandonment of Mineral Rights, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1227,
1228 (1969) (noting the "seldom-articulated but ancient policy disfavoring voids or gaps in
the chain of title to land"). None of this should be taken as an expression of the general im-
pulse associated with pre-Realist jurisprudence to impute to the law a kind of crystalline per-
fection. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 16-19 (1983); see
also Harris, supra note 61, at 54 (remarking that "few of us today suppose that determinate
solutions to all problems can be read off deductively from received concepts"). Rather, it is a
reminder of certain operating rules specific to property that play a central role in its organi-
zation. There is some room for error and for play in the joints in property, but not much:
Property law is generally quite insistent on a high level of precision because of its aspiration
to provide a reliable bottom-line account of basic, static entitlements. See Tabac, supra note
88, at 408-10.
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credible when the law formally recognizes that a different result would
have obtained if the determination had been made elsewhere. This may
or may not be a problem from the standpoint of strict Rule-of-Law theo-
ry, but it is discomforting as a practical matter. 25 Nevertheless, it is tol-
erated in almost all areas of American law other than property law, and
indeed, this was so even in the days of the First Restatement. 12
6
One reason for property's special treatment may be that property
more clearly exposes the issue. The unity and continuity of property-
the notion that a property right is somehow a static thing unto itself-
brings out the unease generated by a fractured legal order in a way the
more bilateral, one-off relationships arising in tort and contract do not. If
a contract or tort dispute is subjected to the vagaries of contradictory
conflicts regimes, the damage is largely contained to the parties and is
less likely to depend on prior transactions, to impinge upon unwitting
successors, or to affect the legal position of creditors, distant strangers,
or others outside the zone of privity. The relationship is personal to
those affected by it, in the sense that it is not keyed to some exterior
metric like shares in an actual asset and is not thought of as distributing
some imaginary legal particle as between all legal actors. Because prop-
erty is built on the idea of a continuously extant right with a kind of ob-
jective legal meaning, there is a sense in which property, to a greater ex-
tent than other legal problems, threatens to embarrass the law by calling
attention to the manifest self-contradiction of overlapping, inconsistent
authorities.
None of this should be taken too far-legal concepts should not be
fetishized. 127 Nevertheless, respect for the conceptual architecture of
125 It is a core premise of a genuinely legal system that norms should not contradict one
another. See Fuller, supra note 99, at 65-70. Conflict-of-laws rules represent an attempt to
reconcile the problem of contradictory norms. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 1005-08 (1991). Yet there is a sense in which the ability of conflicts
rules to effect such reconciliations is called into doubt when those conflict-resolving rules
themselves contradict each another. Cf. Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and
Choice of Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1191, 1249 (1987) (arguing non-contradiction principle forbids
forum preference for forum law and responding to claim that the principle might "coherently
apply only within legal regimes, and not across legal regimes" (emphasis omitted)).
12' The problem was admittedly less acute when there was greater uniformity in conflicts
rules, but it is still the case that the First Restatement was willing to use renvoi in the context
of certain property issues but rejected it entirely in tort and contract cases. Compare Re-
statement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 8 (1934), with id. § 7.
127 Cf. Smith, supra note 28, at 1700 (remarking that "[u]nreflective conceptualism or for-
malism is a nonstarter").
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property matters. The reasons are partly instrumental. For one thing, the
underlying purposes in structuring legal relationships the way property
law does are likely to be frustrated when that structure is compromised.
A system of bottom-line, good-against-the-world entitlements affords a
special measure of security, for example, 128 and when multiple property
systems potentially govern the same asset, that security is compromised.
At a more general level, we may say that conceptual coherence is valua-
ble from the standpoint of comprehensibility. A legal regime that is sys-
tematic and organized on a principled basis can generally be expected to
be easier to understand than one that is not. In dealing with abstrac-
tions-and law is necessarily abstract-human comprehension depends
on techniques like metaphor, analogy, translation, and reification, 129 and
overlooking their role therefore has potentially serious costs. This is par-
ticularly true for property, where the concepts at issue seem so clearly
oriented toward making it easier for legal players to understand the rules
of the game.130 "The revolutionary contribution of an integrated property
system is that it solves a basic problem of cognition," writes the econo-
mist Hernando de Soto. Indeed, he argues, the secret of the developed
world's success lies in the standardization of property norms and of
techniques for "representing economic aspects of the things we own and
assembling them into categories that our minds can quickly grasp.' 3 1
Property has given rise to its own linguistic and visual vocabularies, and
especially if de Soto is correct that the hallmark of a good system of
property law is that it is systematic and "mind-friendly,"'' 32 these merit
consideration in the formulation of procedural rules and enforcement
structures.
128 See, e.g., Honor6, supra note 64, at 468.
.29 See Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modem Truth in Ancient
Wisdom 2 (2006) (stating that human beings "understand new or complex things in relation
to things we already know").
130 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing reification, nemo dat princi-
ple, and role of physical possession in property law).
13! de Soto, supra note 111, at 218-19; see also id. at 52-53.
132 Id. at 218. In this sense, de Soto continues, "property systems are like Coase's firm-
controlled environments to reduce transaction costs." Id. at 220; see also Tyler v. Judges of
the Court of Registration, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (Mass. 1900) ("Personification and naming the
res as defendant are mere symbols, not the essential matter. They are fictions, conveniently
expressing the nature of the process and the result; nothing more."); Rose, supra note 93, at
88 (arguing that possessory acts comprise a "commonly understood and shared set of sym-
bols"). It might be added that to criticize the situs rule as "rigid" or "mechanical" is in a
sense to repair to the same sorts of conceptual techniques.
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It should also be said, however, that internal coherence need not be
seen only as the means to an end, much less the single end of lubricating
the wheels of the law's machinery. There are reasons to think a measure
of theoretical consistency and comprehensibility serves jurisprudential
values and is not simply a tool of policy.133 One might say that if there is
a lawyer's answer to a legal question-a distinctly legal way of resolv-
ing a legal issue, involving the tools of legal reasoning and the materials
of legal authority, as opposed to goals exterior to the law-then it is the
lawyer's answer that the law should adopt. And further, if internal co-
herence does indeed have this kind of intrinsic jurisprudential value, we
might conclude that one goal in developing a system for resolving con-
flict of laws should be avoiding unnecessary damage to the analytical
structure and self-conception of the fields of substantive law with which
it deals. 34 This is not a goal that is often made explicit in conflict of
laws, but it does seem to be how things do actually work. Thus, for ex-
ample, transporting chattels from one state to another does not affect ex-
isting property rights,'35 since property imagines a general stability of
ownership that can be changed only by a limited set of events that does
not include transportation from one place to another. Making title to
property a function of the forum in which the parties litigate their case is
problematic in a similar way.
The two overarching problems discussed here that arise under a non-
uniform approach to the resolution of property disputes-informational
complexity and conceptual disjoint-can perhaps be illustrated by con-
sidering the possibility of having multiple, uncoordinated title registra-
tion systems simultaneously applicable to the same issue of title to the
same asset. Such duplication would undermine the very benefits regis-
tration systems are meant to provide: Actors would have to consult eve-
ry possible system to ascertain the information they need, and in the
133 For different arguments about and understandings of the idea of internal coherence, see
Ken Kress, Why No Judge Should Be a Dworkinian Coherentist, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1375, 1376
(1999); Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 273, 275 (1992); Cass
Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1153, 1153-55 (2002);
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L.J. 949,
968-71 (1988).
134 A parallel might be drawn in contracts, where the conflict-of-laws issue is frequently
resolved by contractual provision. See Hay et al., supra note 2, at 1085-88. The treatment of
conflicts questions in tort cases, it might also be noted, seems to have placed some emphasis
on foreseeable sources of law. See id. at 796-99.
135 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 247 (1971).
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event of conflict between systems, the information would be effectively
undiscoverable absent a single set of rules for resolving such conflicts.
Both the efficient operation and the coherence of the overall system are
compromised because each of those goals depends upon the communi-
cation of information. When conflicting registries exist, none of them is
able to answer the question property law is supposed to resolve: Who,
when all is said and done, has what rights in a given thing, as against all
other claimants? Title registries are visible manifestations of what the
rules of property law seek to accomplish in a more abstract fashion-the
provision of a definitive and accessible account of who has rights in
what. Much as a multiplicity of registration systems prevents property
law from doing its job, competing sets of rules for resolving the same
allocational issue for the same item of property makes each set of prop-
erty rules less property-like.
IV. UNIFORMITY AND THE SITus RULE
A. Situs as Focal Point
If uniformity is the goal, the situs rule is a highly plausible way to
achieve it. As a tool for coordination among states, it has a number of
advantages; indeed, it is hard to imagine a conflict-of-laws doctrine bet-
ter suited to the encouragement of uniform treatment of property. For a
start, the situs rule is firmly established,1 6 and when uniformity already
exists, the most sensible thing is to leave well enough alone. The broad
and bright-line quality of the rule also contributes to its usefulness as a
coordination device. Coordination through unilateral action is easier
with simpler rules, which provide a better focus around which a consen-
sus might coalesce. 137 A broad and bright-line rule serves as a signal to
others, and it makes it easier to track defections from the plan of coordi-
nated action. The location of property also makes for a good focal point
because it is often easy to determine, if not patently obvious,13' and,
moreover, the rule that in property disputes the relevant location for pur-
136 See Finch, supra note 39, at 259-60.
137 On focal points, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 54-58 (1980);
Maarten C.W. Janssen, Rationalizing Focal Points, 50 Theory & Decision 119, 119 (2001);
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1651
(2000); Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 Econ. J. 533, 533 (1995).
138 See Michael J. Whincop, Conflicts in the Cathedral: Towards a Theory of Property
Rights in Private International Law, 50 U. Toronto L.J. 41, 50 (2000).
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poses of a system of territorial allocation is the location of the property
will often gel with individual expectations.'39
The second-order component of the situs rule also does a great deal to
reduce the possibility that property questions will be resolved differently
by different courts. 140 A limitation on adjudicative jurisdiction would
appear to be the perfect uniformity device: If only one state even gets
the chance to apply its conflict-of-laws rules, there is no possibility of
inter-jurisdictional divergence on the conflicts question. Renvoi is even
more obviously geared toward the promotion of uniformity, since the
use of a single set of conflicts rules is precisely what renvoi entails. 14 1 In
addition, both variants of the situs rule's second-order component serve
as a kind of red flag; they signal that the matter is very important, high-
lighting the position of the focal-point state and drawing attention to any
state that adopts a contrary approach. They also help moderate the prob-
lems of over- and under-inclusiveness associated with bright-line rules:
The state whose conflicts laws apply can adopt a somewhat more granu-
lar conflict-of-laws regime than might otherwise be possible if uniformi-
ty were to be achieved simply through the design of first-order rules for
selecting applicable substantive law.
Ironically, as this last comment implies, an ideal rule from the stand-
point of encouraging uniformity should also pay heed to other conflicts
policies besides uniformity. A rule that frequently produces patently un-
just or unwise results as a substantive matter may be less effective as a
focal point because defections will be more likely. Is the situs rule a
wise choice from the standpoint of policy? This is the point on which
scholars have been most vociferous in their criticism. Yet the use of si-
ms law has some real attractions as a mode of resolving jurisdictional
139 See infra text accompanying note 153.
140 If there is already substantial uniformity, however, renvoi may actually do more harm
than good. See Kuhn, supra note 43, at 1035-38 (arguing renvoi is unnecessary in Article 9
of the U.C.C. because the U.C.C. itself assures that conflicts rules are generally uniform).
141 See Robert L. Felix & Ralph U. Whitten, American Conflicts Law 468 (6th ed. 2011)
("If uniformity in title holdings is sought, the one way in which a nonsitus court can achieve
uniformity is by handling the problem as nearly as possible the way a situs court would han-
dle it. This means the nonsitus court would apply the whole law of the situs, starting with its
conflicts law, to the problem."). Compared to a rule limiting adjudicative jurisdiction, ren-
voi's effectiveness in securing uniformity is lessened by (a) the likelihood one state will mis-
apply another's conflicts rules, (b) limits on the scope of the renvoi rule (it may not apply to
procedural issues, for instance), and (c) the possibility courts will take a renvoi rule less seri-
ously than a restriction on their jurisdiction because a jurisdictional limit is more visible and
of more apparent gravity.
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conflicts over property, sufficient at least to make the selection of situs
law an acceptable choice as a uniform standard.
State Interests. Interest analysis proponents maintain that the location
of property often has no relation to the purposes underlying the compet-
ing state laws invoked in conflicts cases.1 42 That claim, however, rests
on certain assumptions about the way the connection between property
situs and policy interests is to be evaluated. If the assessment is made on
a case-by-case and issue-by-issue basis, as the critics urge, the appropri-
ateness of situs law is likely to vary from one instance to the next. But
uniformity necessitates a broader rule, and given that necessity, the situs
rule arguably is not only a good, but perhaps even the best, possible
choice. By framing the problem at a higher level of generality, the ques-
tion shifts from a state's hypothesized interest in preferring some very
specific class of property claimants in a very particular kind of dispute to
a state's interest in knowing and being able to control who it is that suc-
ceeds to the asset at issue. 143 And, notwithstanding some of the sweeping
claims of interest analysis scholars, it would seem that the state where an
asset is located will probably always have some interest in being able to
decide the identity of the asset's owner, and by extension, in the pro-
cesses by which ownership is acquired and transferred.
144
Substantive Virtues. The situs rule also has virtues outside the frame-
work of an analysis of governmental regulatory interests. The use of the
location of property as the central choice-of-law criterion gels with the
ideas that underlie property law. There is a strong conceptual similarity
between sovereign jurisdiction and property, 145 particularly for real
142 See supra note 52.
143 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
144 For one thing, the use of property is likely to have an effect on the surrounding com-
munity. For another, stability of title and rules for transfer of property, and policies that af-
fect the fragmentation of property interests have an impact on local markets, a matter of ob-
vious sims concern. Where the situs state maintains a registry for recording property
transactions, it also has an interest in having property issues determined by rules that are fa-
miliar and subject to its control. In addition, the situs state may be said to have an interest in
the distribution of wealth within its jurisdiction and in its tax base, both of which are affected
by the allocation of property rights. And as already noted, only the situs state has the power
directly to enforce judgments concerning title to things within its borders, and it may be eas-
ier and more convenient if its officers are responsible only for matters resolved under local
law. Similar considerations of economy support using situs law in land cases where only si-
tus courts have jurisdiction to determine title and other property interests.
145 See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. Toronto L.J. 275,
293-95 (2008); see also Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 Minn. L. Rev.
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property, 141 which, like most sovereign authority today, entails control
over physical space. 147 Because the situs rule mirrors the conceptual ar-
chitecture of property, the rule is harmonious with the substantive law of
property at a very basic level. Property is thing-centered, and the loca-
tion of the res whose use is the subject of potential dispute is the most
obvious connection between it and a territorially defined state. So while
some critics denounce the situs rule because "the relationships relevant
for choice criteria are those between sovereigns and people, not those
between sovereigns and property,' ' 148 their argument ignores the imper-
sonal, thing-centric nature of property law. The "modularity" of property
as a legal system-its division of the universe of a large class of legal
problems into discrete, semi-autonomous units-has the benefit of re-
ducing the information that legal actors need to ascertain, the personal
characteristics of entitlement holders being foremost among them. 149 The
situs rule centers the conflict-of-laws inquiry on the features used to
form the individual units of property law. And it minimizes reliance on
1, 35 (1989); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 12-14 (1928);
A. John Simmons, On the Territorial Rights of States, 11 Phil. Issues 300, 316-17 (2001).
146 See Henry Sidgwick, The Elements of Politics 222 (4th ed. 1919) (observing that "in
modem political thought the connection between a political society and its territory is so
close that the two notions almost blend"). The U.S. Constitution uses the word "jurisdiction"
to refer to geographic territory in several places. E.g., U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3 (declaring that
"no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State").
147 See 1 John Westlake, A Treatise on Private International Law, or the Conflict of Laws,
with Principal Reference to Its Practice in the English and Other Cognate Systems of Juris-
prudence 128 (London, C. Roworth & Sons 1858); see also Penner, supra note 28, at 152
("Land is not only property, it is territory, the extent of the jurisdiction of the State. Owning
land depends on political sovereignty in a much more direct way than does the ownership of
chattels, for the ability to maintain one's rights to land depends on whether the State is able
to hold its territory against invaders from without or rebels from within."). Indeed, in a
Lockean account, it is individual members' property rights in land that legitimate a civil
government's territorial jurisdiction. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government,
in Two Treatises of Government 345-49 (Peter Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (1698); Simmons, su-
pra note 145, at 312-13.
148 Baxter, supra note 19, at 16.
149 See Smith, supra note 28, at 1703-04. For this reason, it might be thought especially
peculiar to look to personal characteristics like domicile as a choice-of-law criterion in the
context of property. There are some situations where practical considerations may make
domicile the most appropriate connecting factor, but generally speaking the use of personal
characteristics should be discouraged where it does not offer clear benefits. The premise of
much governmental interest analysis theory that state laws are intended only to benefit dom-
iciliaries would ordinarily seem to be an inappropriate foundation for a conflict-of-laws prin-
ciple where property is concerned.
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factors that property law's clustering of legal issues along thing-based
lines is meant to make less important to discover.
Indeed, sovereign jurisdiction is itself a modular structural concept, in
that it reflects a division of the world into distinct, largely independent
units-a system of territorially defined jurisdiction especially so because
the divisions are made in such a way that the interface governing inter-
actions between units is relatively simplified, impersonal, and standard-
ized.150 In dealing with "the application of law in space," said Benjamin
Cardozo, "[t]he walls of the compartments must be firm, the lines of
demarcation plain, or there will be overlappings and encroachments with
incongruities and clashes. In such circumstances, the finality of the rule
150 See James Anderson, Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings
27 (2002) (stating that territoriality is "a 'spatial strategy' which uses territory and borders to
control, classify and communicate" and that its "advantages include simplifying issues of
control, giving relationships of power a greater tangibility, and providing easily understood
symbolic markers 'on the ground'); Hendrick Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competi-
tors: An Analysis of Systems Change 34-35 (1996) (stating that "the modem state defines
the human collectivity in a completely novel way. It defines individuals by spatial markers,
regardless of kin, tribal affiliation, or religious beliefs. Individuals are in a sense amorphous
and undifferentiated entities who are given an identity simply by their location in a particular
area"); Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 Mich. L. Rev. 843,
867 (1999) (stating that the development of territorial jurisdiction displaced "existing social
relations based on personal status," and "[t]o use the terms of private law, it initiated a shift
from statuses in gross or in personam to statuses bound to political territory"); Matt Whitt,
The Paradox of Sovereignty: Authority, Constitution, and Political Boundaries 200 (Aug.
2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University) (stating that "territoriality fa-
cilitates the achievement of modem sovereignty by providing a mediating framework for the
exercise of sovereign authority, objectifying its jurisdiction, and objectifying the collective
subject of that authority"); see also Steven Pinker, The Stuff of Thought: Language as a
Window into Human Nature 155 (2007) (stating that a fundamental aspect of the way human
cognitive functions are constituted is that "[c]ontinuous three-dimensional space is an ever-
present matrix in which the objects of our imagination must be located").
Richard Ford has identified a series of what he considers prototypical characteristics of
modem territorial jurisdiction. In a system of territorial jurisdiction, boundaries are ordinari-
ly unambiguous, corresponding to "a 'bright line' rule, never a flexible standard," and within
those boundaries, authority is defined abstractly, "eliminat[ing] the need for the specific
enumeration and classification by kind." Ford, supra, at 853 (emphasis omitted). Here we
have the simple interfaces and open-ended class of uses that correspond to property law's
modular structure. This arrangement, moreover, "tends to present social and political rela-
tionships as impersonal," which can again be seen as a way of making the relevant legal rela-
tionships easier to comprehend and of generating fluid social institutions. Id. at 854 (empha-
sis omitted). And, similar to property law's zero-sum architecture, the system tends "to
produce 'gapless' maps of contiguous political territories." Id. Jurisdiction, in other words, is
an allocational scheme that assigns individual situations to chunky legal categories within
which they can be dealt more particularly.
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is in itself a jural end.' 51 Modem conflicts methodologies like govern-
mental interest analysis can be seen as a shift away from this approach.
These methods still accept territorial divisions of state authority as a
starting point,'52 but in a way that effectively decreases the modularity of
the overall system: They show relatively little concern for the possibility
that the authority of the different territorial states might overlap when a
legal problem is connected in some way with more than one state's terri-
tory or that the rules for determining which territorial contacts to count
in assigning a problem to a particular state may become complex and ir-
regular. Whatever its merits as a general matter, this partial demodulari-
zation would look rather strange if extended to property issues. Conflict-
of-laws rules serve to connect the modular system of territorially defined
states to the modular system of property law, and to use de-modularizing
rules to manage this interface would be a bit like attempting to translate
a scientific manual from English to Chinese by first converting it to a
Romantic ode.
Design Virtues. Many of the attributes of the rule that make it a good
focal point for coordination among different legal systems are merits in
their own right. For a start, because property is thing-centered, and be-
cause its thing-centrism is meant to make the system of property law
generally comprehensible, the situs rule has the additional virtue of, if
not intuitiveness, at least not being counterintuitive-as a general mat-
ter, a property owner could hardly be surprised by a rule that title to
property is determined by the law of the place where the property is lo-
cated, even if she thinks there might be a better or more natural rule in
151 Benjamin Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 67 (1928).
152 First Restatement-type approaches are often condemned as "territorialist" but the label
is somewhat misleading. Although there are many different conflict-of-laws methods that
have been proposed in the United States, none of them operate without some recourse to ter-
ritorial conceptions of state power. For example, although in many cases interest analysis
shifts the focus from the location of particular events in favor of party residence or domicile,
these are still essentially territorial connections: one does not become a Texas domiciliary by
moving to San Francisco. That a First Restatement-type doctrine-the place of injury to re-
solve a tort issue, for example--can be described as "territorial" as a way of communicating
how it differs from, say, a rule based on the place where the parties are domiciled, is an indi-
cation of the comparative simplicity and salience of the kind of territorial connection that
such a doctrine uses. The connection and the logic that suggests it are so apparent-even to
those who reject that connection as a normative foundation for choice of law-that it appears
as though the territory itself is doing all the work.
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her case.153 Furthermore, the situs of property is easily determined, and
there may also be some value in using the same conflicts rule that ap-
plies in international conflicts, where the position of the situs rule is fair-
ly secure. 154 The use of the location of property as choice-of-law criteri-
on also ensures a measure of stability. Much as it is desirable to ensure
that the legal rules governing property not change with the forum of liti-
gation, there is value in having property governed by the same legal
rules irrespective of the passage of time or shifting fact constellations.
For real property, the situs rule makes temporal considerations entirely
irrelevant since land-"immovable property" in conflicts jargon-is
permanently situated in the same place, while for chattels, the use of si-
tus law at least ensures that property rights do not fluctuate according to
the identity of the parties involved.'55 Finally, quite apart from the use of
situs as such, the simple and bright-line nature of the rule is likely to of-
fer a greater measure of predictability, transparency, and ease of admin-
istration-the usual virtues of broader and more rule-like legal provi-
sions. 156
Systemic Virtues. Finally, the situs rule can help promote the systemic
goods of individual choice and inter-jurisdictional competition. As to
choice: in contrast to the situation with contract, obstacles to the com-
munication of information make it necessary to place substantial limits
153 See Herbert F. Goodrich, Two States and Real Estate, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 417, 419
(1941). But see Alden, supra note 19, at 596 (asserting that any expectation that situs law
will apply is "generated by what courts have done in the past"). Although the situs rule gen-
erally conforms to a certain lay intuition, frustration of party expectations may be a serious
concern in some contexts. The situs rule can and has been moderated in situations in which
there is a risk of surprise, as with the use of "borrowing statutes" and conflicts rules that ex-
plicitly prefer whichever legal provision connected with a dispute would validate an attempt-
ed transfer. E.g., Unif. Probate Code § 2-506 (1991). There is certainly room for such re-
forms, but the need for uniformity still suggests a single jurisdiction-that is, the situs-
should perhaps be used to determine whether such reforms apply, although the issue may not
make much practical difference since these statutes tend to be uniform anyway. See Hay et
al., supra note 2, at 1295 & n.4.
154 In international cases, the situs rule is supported by additional reasons-the necessity of
situs cooperation at the enforcement stage, for example-that do not apply with the same
force in domestic situations.
155 In a case in which the situs of land ("immovable property") changed because of shifting
state boundaries, the states in question agreed that questions concerning the validity of pre-
existing property interests in such land at the time of the boundary shift would be determined
under the law of the state where the land had previously been located. See Nebraska v. Iowa,
406 U.S. 117, 120 (1972).
156 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557,
565-66 (1992) (drawing distinction between simplicity and rule-ness).
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on the ability of individuals to customize their property rights.'5 7 Stand-
ardization in property law helps combat the information cost problem,
but it also imposes costs of its own because it prevents parties from ar-
ranging their relations in the most mutually beneficial fashion. The situs
rule allows a degree of customization-a property owner can locate or
invest in assets within the jurisdiction of her choice-while at the same
time providing clear and reasonably cheap notice to the world of the le-
gal regime that has been selected.'58 Voluntary choice of law is availa-
ble, subject to the conditions that the whole cluster of issues pertaining
to a given asset is governed by the same body of substantive law and
that the asset is packaged along with all others for which the same selec-
tion has been made.' 59
The situs rule also helps create the conditions necessary for beneficial
competition among states-that is, it harnesses individual choice in
ways that may induce lawmaking bodies to produce better legal regimes,
or at least to avoid worse ones. 160 A competition-fostering rule requires
157 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 61, at 31-34.
158 A domicile-based rule, by contrast, allows choice only insofar as one is willing to relo-
cate oneself, and not simply one's assets. See Michael J. Whincop & Mary Keyes, Policy
PraAmatism in the Conflict of Laws 111 (2001).
See O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 52, at 1220-21; see also Bell & Parchomovsky, su-
pra note 19, at 78-79 (arguing that being able to choose governing property law results in
"[a] richer menu of property rules [that] gives individuals a greater chance of finding the
most suitable property regime for them"). At the level of the states themselves, the situs rule
offers the attractions of mutual accommodation and non-interference. See Alfred P. Hill, The
Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1585, 1629 (1985) (observing that
the "non-situs forum of today may be the non-forum situs of tomorrow"). To that extent, the
situs rule may be seen as responsive to individual preferences in terms of "voice," as well as
"exit," see Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States 4, 15-17 (1970), inasmuch as it promotes conflicts uniformity and
jurisdictional exclusivity. The ability to vote on property law is of diminished effectiveness
when jurisdictional authority significantly overlaps and the regime selected by voters is sub-
ject to competing regimes selected by other voters. This is a virtue of exclusivity as a general
democratic principle, and, to the extent the situs of a person's property corresponds with the
place where the person is eligible to vote in elections that may affect property law, it also
bears upon the choice of property law to which one's own property is subject. Cf. Ilya
Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. Chi. Legal F. 53, 58 (2011) (arguing that
"[e]xit rights are little help in protecting assets that you can't take with you when you
leave").
160 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 19, at 79, 98-101 (arguing that jurisdictional
competition "creates a fertile ground for experimentation with new property forms and pro-
liferation of these forms as states adopt laws that have proven useful in other states"); see
also Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 418-23
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some linkage between the incentives that would encourage a state to of-
fer an attractive property regime and the criteria that trigger the applica-
tion of its law. Those incentives include tax revenue, stronger local
commercial markets, and the many other benefits associated with capital
inflow. The location of property is very much tied to those benefits-
local property is likely to be subject to local taxes, traded on local mar-
kets, and enjoyed by local people. Jurisdictional competition also re-
quires clear and relatively simple lines of demarcation; the more fine-
grained, blurry, or overlapping each state's domain becomes, the more
difficult it becomes for effective competition to take place. If an asset is
subject to one state's law for some purposes and another state's for other
purposes, it becomes harder for owners to determine where to locate
their assets and harder for states to trace the effect of their policies on
the choices property owners make. On this score, too, the situs rule, with
its broad framing, excels.
For all these reasons, if a state were attempting to formulate principles
for choosing whose substantive property law governs questions of title
to property, the rule that such questions are usually or always a matter of
situs law would be a good choice. Perhaps it is the optimal choice, or
perhaps not. But it is a plausible choice, and given the need for coordi-
nation, that is good enough.
B. Uniformly Uniformity?
This list of virtues other than uniformity promotion might prompt one
to ask whether uniformity and jurisdictional exclusivity are really neces-
sary to justify the rule. It is certainly possible, though the possibility is
difficult to assess, since an absence of uniformity would erode many of
the situs rule's seemingly freestanding benefits-predictability and ju-
risdictional competition, for example. To the extent these additional vir-
tues are equally applicable to First Restatement-type approaches to con-
flict of laws as a general matter, justifications for the situs rule based
upon them may also prove too much for purposes of this analysis, since
they fail to show why the situs rule should outlive the rest of the ancien
regime in conflicts. Yet they are not always equally applicable to the
whole of traditional conflicts doctrine, and at least in terms of an expla-
nation, if not a justification, for what courts have done, other factors
(1956) (discussing incentives created under multi-jurisdictional system in which actors can
vote with their feet).
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probably did play a role. Overall, the location of property presents fewer
ambiguities than the place where a contract was made or a tort was
committed, for example. Conflicts issues involving contracts can largely
be dealt with through choice-of-law clauses, moreover, while a general
expansion of liability and commitment to loss-spreading helps account
for the rejection of older conflicts doctrines that left less room for judi-
cial discretion or forum-preference in the tort arena. And to the extent
the other virtues of the situs rule discussed in the preceding section-
intuitiveness, simplicity, and lack of regard for the personal characteris-
tics of individual entitlement holders, to give a few examples-help
ameliorate the problems of complexity and high information costs prop-
erty law creates, they too support adherence to traditional conflicts doc-
trine where property is concerned, even after it had been abandoned
elsewhere.
At any rate, while it is possible the situs rule's position may be over-
determined, there is nevertheless reason to view uniformity as the prima-
ry reason to support it. Overlapping prescriptive jurisdiction presents
unique conceptual difficulties for property, and while the other virtues of
the situs rule discussed above depend on a measure of uniformity, the
conceptual value of uniformity to property does not depend upon them
in the same way. Uniformity and exclusivity are important to property
law's coherence even if, say, the rule that uniformly and exclusively ap-
plies is hard to predict ex ante or if assets or capital cannot easily be
moved from one jurisdiction to another.
Uniformity's preeminence is born out by doctrinal practices. The
most unusual features of the situs rule are its continued interstate uni-
formity, its imperviousness in the face of the Conflicts Revolution, and
its use of renvoi. There is good reason to think these features are linked.
The singular benefit of renvoi is uniformity, 16' and given that it was un-
derstood that the Conflicts Revolution would be bad for uniformity, 6 2
161 See, e.g., Richard Fentiman, Choice of Law in Europe: Uniformity and Integration, 82
Tul. L. Rev. 2021, 2029 (2008).
162 Professor Brainerd Currie, for instance, was quite candid about his relative lack of con-
cern for uniformity. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 22, at 100-01, 168-69 (stating that the
"most forceful affirmative defense that can be made for the traditional method is that it leads
to uniformity of result, regardless of the state in which the action is brought" but concluding
any such uniformity not "worth the cost" by asserting that "the ideal of uniformity is given
too high a priority" and that forum shopping in some cases "seems positively commenda-
ble"); see also Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (Cal. 1967) (Traynor, C.J.) ("Ease of de-
termining applicable law and uniformity of rules of decision, however, must be subordinated
2014]
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the situs rule's persistence can be seen as a choice to prefer uniformity
to the Conflicts Revolution's attractions-where property is concerned.
The strength of the perceived need for uniformity is also born out both
by the considerable costs that renvoi can entail and the variety of con-
texts in which it nevertheless appears. Having to use another jurisdic-
tion's conflicts rules is a complicated business and can give rise to some
famously difficult analytical conundrums. 163 Yet despite all this, renvoi
was reluctantly deployed in connection with property even in the days of
the First Restatement when uniformity was easier to come by,' 64 and,
tellingly, renvoi is used today in certain property contexts where the si-
tus of property is not the criterion that is used as the choice-of-law focal
point. 165 It should be noted that if the primary reason for the situs rule
were "thing-ness," simplicity, autonomy, or any other such goal, the use
of renvoi would be difficult to explain-a pointless and obscure doctri-
nal twist, at best, and a step in the wrong direction, at worst.
In short, in addition to the explanations for uniformity's special im-
portance where property is concerned developed above, the fact of the
situs rule's uniform application across the country, the rule's costly,
longstanding, relatively broad, and virtually unique use of renvoi, and
the other features of the situs rule that tend to promote uniformity all of-
fer reason to believe uniformity is and should be a paramount concern
where property is concerned.
to the objective of proper choice of law in conflict cases, i.e., to determine the law that most
appropriately applies to the issue involved." (citation omitted)). But see Wilcox v. Wilcox,
133 N.W.2d 408, 416 (Wis. 1965) (adopting the Second Restatement in the expectation it
would lead to national uniformity in conflict of laws).
163 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 125, at 980; see also Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276
F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.) ("Our principal task.., is to determine what the
New York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which nei-
ther has thought.").
164 Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 8 (1934).
165 Succession to chattels is one example, where courts are supposed to apply the conflicts
rules of the decedent's domicile. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 260-63
(1969); see also, e.g., In re Estate of Wright, 637 A.2d 106, 109 (Me. 1994). Professor Jo-
seph Beale was hostile to such an approach, preferring to rationalize apparent instances of
renvoi in cases concerning succession to chattels on other grounds. See 1 Beale, supra note
64, at 57-58 (arguing use of domicile law in succession cases is a principle of substantive
law, rather than a conflict-of-laws rule, and that situs conflicts rules always govern).
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C. Breadth and Overbreadth
A persistent theme in scholarly criticism of the situs rule is the charge
that the rule is too broad-indeed, "much too broad" and "hopelessly
undiscriminating."' 66 While a connection between the breadth of the rule
and the goal of uniformity has already been noted, academic preoccupa-
tion with the scope of the rule calls for a closer examination of a few
basic issues pertaining to its reach.
To begin with, the "monolithic"'' 6' nature of the situs rule has a num-
ber of important strengths as a general matter. As discussed, it helps se-
cure uniformity by creating a clear and obvious focal point and by sim-
plifyirig the doctrines that states are supposed to employ in concert with
one another. The breadth of the rule also helps combat the "characteriza-
tion" problem-the problem of identifying the appropriate category to
which a particular legal issue belongs-which is often held up as a ma-
jor defect of traditional conflict-of-laws rules because of its perceived
subjectivity.16 Thanks to the situs rule's wide sweep, legal actors can
repair to a simple rule of thumb: When in doubt, situs law probably ap-
plies. 69 A similar advantage of the rule's breadth is that it creates a
buffer zone to protect against false negatives-cases failing to apply si-
tus law where situs law should be applied (although possibly at the ex-
pense of cases in which it should not be). The rule's breadth is useful to
other goals like predictability, facilitation of choice, and jurisdictional
competition for reasons previously noted. And the rule's breadth is con-
sistent with the general tenor of property. By simplifying the conflicts
inquiry, it reflects the preference for "lumpy" entitlements that charac-
166 Hancock, Mary le Bow, supra note 18, at 566; see also Richman & Reynolds, supra
note 19, at 424-25 ("The problem with the situs rule ... is an imbalance between its scope
and rationale. The scope of the rule extends to nearly all questions involving title to real
property, but its rationales work in only a fraction of those cases."); Ralph U. Whitten, Cur-
ing the Deficiencies of the Conflicts Revolution: A Proposal for National Legislation on
Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and Judgments, 37 Willamette L. Rev. 259, 294-95 (2001)
(stating that "the situs rule extends far beyond these legitimate interests of the situs state to
prevent the enforcement of nonsitus judgments in the courts of the situs where no conceiva-
ble interest of the situs state would be served by refusing enforcement").167 Weintraub, supra note 19, at 574.
168 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 4, at 1133-34 (2010).
169 See Finch, supra note 39, at 260 ("As much as any choice-of-law rule, the situs rule
provides an unequivocal answer ... ").
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terizes the law of property as a whole. 70 It thereby reinforces that ap-
proach, makes the law more internally consistent, and draws upon lay
intuitions. Perhaps most importantly, it responds to the same problems
that inspire property to adopt a simplified, thing-centered system of enti-
tlements in the first place-it reduces complexity by smoothing the
rough edges of legal forms and making them more interchangeable.
Simply put, it helps make the practice of standardization itself more
standard.
Modem conflicts methodologies like interest analysis celebrate d-
peqage, the practice of performing a separate conflict-of-laws analysis
for different individual issues within the same, larger dispute.17' Often
this means breaking apart what William Allen and Professor Erin
O'Hara call the "policy bundles" of individual states-sets of seemingly
separate legal provisions that work in tandem to secure a larger goal or a
balance between competing ones. 72 Property law too has its bundles:
Since at least the days of legal realism, property has been frequently de-
picted as an ad hoc "bundle of sticks"-each stick representing a differ-
ent legal issue between a single pair of actors, somewhat arbitrarily as-
sociated with others with which it is bundled. 173 More recently, however,
a number of property scholars have argued that the bilateral, disaggre-
gated, and contingent vision reflected in this description gets property
law backwards. What is significant about property is that it does not ap-
proach each issue of resource use entirely anew, deciding it on the basis
of first principles. 174 Property divides the world into separate packages
of legal problems according to the particular resource involved, and,
even when property is substantially regulated, it tends to rely on a single,
170 See Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1955, 1956-57 (2012)
(stating that "[p]roperty law is lumpy as a positive matter, filled with doctrines and ap-
proaches that deal with the world in discrete, hard-to-divide chunks").
171 William M. Richman, Diagramming Conflicts: A Graphic Understanding on Interest
Analysis, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 317, 330-33 (1982); see also Willis L.M. Reese, Ddpegage: A
Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 58, 58-69, 71-72 (1973).
172 See William H. Allen & Erin A. O'Hara, Second Generation Law and Economics of
Conflict of Laws: Baxter's Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1011,
1034-35 (1999).
173 Horwitz, supra note 23, at 156 (1992) (discussing the Hohfeldian conception of proper-
Y'74 Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in
American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 959, 963-64 (2009) (observing that "because
the default package [of property rights] is lumpy, it sweeps in all sorts of as-yet-unspecified
uses and potential interactions and declares the owner the winner").
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fairly simple mechanism like ownership to resolve most issues pertain-
ing to that resource.1 75 In other words, the approach that property gener-
ally reflects is the antithesis of the kind of issue-by-issue, context-heavy,
policy-based analysis that situs rule critics advocate for conflict of
laws. 76 If the situs rule is "overbroad," so too is property, therefore, and
the sweep of the rule is at least defensible on the ground that it harmo-
nizes conflict-of-laws doctrine with underlying principles of substantive
law. But more than that, it is defensible because there is reason to be-
lieve those underlying private law principles themselves stand on sound
footing, and some care should therefore be taken to ensure that the for-
mulation of jurisdictional rules does not needlessly subvert them.
Beyond these observations about the situs rule's breadth as a general
matter, a few more specific issues merit a brief examination:
First-Order Component. Given the sits rule's second-order compo-
nent, which has the effect of requiring any court to use the situs's con-
flict-of-laws doctrines, it might seem superfluous from the standpoint of
uniformity for the situs rule to demand the application of situs substan-
tive law as well. Yet the use of situs substantive law is still important for
a number of reasons. First, it makes the conflicts inquiry much easier.
Situs courts have the benefit of applying their own domestic law, while
non-situs courts forced to apply sits conflicts rules will find their task
mercifully simplified and will be less likely to misconstrue the situs's
conflicts rules. Second, the first-order component is valuable because
the second-order component of the situs rule is not always supposed to
apply and is not always applied when it is supposed to be. Using the
same basic criterion to select applicable law, whether or not situs courts
or situs conflicts rules are to be used, helps keep the basic jurisdictional
175 See Sherwin, supra note 87, at 1076 (discussing ownership as a separate dimension of
property, distinct from use).
1 6 Professor Wesley Hohfeld, whose fragmented analysis of property is reflected in the
bundle metaphor, may also have helped spur the Conflicts Revolution by virtue of his influ-
ence on Professor Walter Wheeler Cook, an early and outspoken critic of the First Restate-
ment. See N.E.H. Hull, Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910-1919, 45 J. Legal
Educ. 235, 277 n.220 (1995) (reporting the story that after Hohfeld's death, "Cook took
Hohfeld's notes for a major piece on conflict of laws, walked off with them, and later pub-
lished them as his own without crediting Hohfeld"). Cook was likewise influenced by
Hohfeld's view of property. See W.W.C., Comment, The Associated Press Case, 28 Yale
L.J. 387, 388 n.6 (1919) (opining that "[t]o say that a person who 'owns' something has 'a
property right' is a totally inadequate way of describing the legal situation" and calling for
use of Hohfeldian analysis of "'multital' jural relations").
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principle simple and clear. Indeed, this is a virtue of using substantive
situs law quite apart from the need for uniformity and would offer some
reason for doing so even if the second-order component of the rule ap-
plied in all cases without exception. Finally, the use of situs substantive
law amplifies the general situs principle by signaling the importance of
the situs's role and enhancing its focal attributes. It also bolsters the
normative position of the situs: If it becomes common for the situs not to
apply its own law, other states may begin to take the situs state's posi-
tion less seriously and be less inclined to respect the second-order com-
ponent-notwithstanding that, in principle, the need for uniformity justi-
fies the second-order component of the situs rule even when the situs
would select another state's substantive law.
Antecedent and Penumbral Issues. Critics have objected to the appli-
cation of the situs rule to matters that merely have some relation to
property and do not seem to be true property issues in the usual sense.
Some of these situations involve legal questions that are preconditions to
a property determination, such as the legitimacy of a putative heir in a
succession dispute. There is a straightforward mandate for the situs rule
in such cases, however, at least in part. Because title to property ulti-
mately turns on the resolution of such issues, the need for uniformity is
not diminished. That by no means requires that the use of situs substan-
tive law must invariably be applied, but it does call for the resolution of
such issues according to whatever state's rule of decision a situs court
would use.'77 Critics have also objected to the application of the situs
rule to certain collateral legal issues, like the interpretation of contracts
pertaining to land.'78 Here too, however, many of the general reasons for
a broad situs rule carry over. The use of situs law emphasizes the general
situs principle and avoids characterization problems-which can be es-
pecially tricky when the characterization depends on whether title to
177 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 233 cmt. b (1971) (commenting that
the situs may wish to determine marital property issues under some other state's law, but that
if it would do so, other states should do likewise); Hay et al., supra note 2, at 1287 (noting
that the "law of the situs will ordinarily recognize the claim of a child validly adopted else-
where to inherit the land"); Finch, supra note 39, at 260; see also A.E. Gotlieb, The Inci-
dental Question Revisited-Theory and Practice in the Conflict of Laws, 26 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 734, 736 (1977); cf. In re Bruington's Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 725, 729 (Sur. Ct. 1936) (ap-
plying situs law to deny recognition to foreign legitimation determination).
8 E.g., Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1585,
1629 (1985) (suggesting use of situs law to resolve "a claim... founded on a contract for the
sale and purchase of situs land (as distinct from a claim to actual title)" may be "indefensi-
ble").
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property is ultimately affected by the way the collateral issue is re-
solved. 7 9 In addition, it may often be desirable to treat such collateral
issues as part of the overall property package, even when it is theoreti-
cally independent as a matter of legal logic, in order to ensure consistent
legal treatment of the same transaction. 18°
Original Parties. Finally, it has been argued that the situs rule should
only come into play in cases involving the effect of a transaction upon a
successor to one of the parties to the transaction, rather than its effect on
the parties themselves.1 81 Yet property's conceptual demand for uni-
formity is as applicable in resolving claims of the original parties as it is
to successors. A two-tiered structure, moreover, undermines the imper-
sonality of property law by applying one legal standard to one owner but
another to someone else standing in his shoes. This creates potentially
distorting incentives to hold on to property or try to launder it through
transactions with unwitting third parties.1 82 And more generally, it intro-
duces destabilizing complications to the governing rule, risking com-
plexity and confusion. 183
179 See Ian F.G. Baxter, Essays on Private Law: Foreign Law and Foreign Judgments 92
(1966) (stating that in conflict-of-laws problems, an "inherent difficulty is the overlap be-
tween the law of contract and the law of property").
180 For example, it may be better that a promissory note and a security interest be equally
valid or invalid, rather than subject to separate determinations. But see Thomson v. Kyle, 23
So. 12, 17 (Fla. 1897); Poison v. Stewart, 45 N.E. 737, 738 (Mass. 1897) (reaching different
results on the two issues).
181 Weintraub, supra note 19, at 575 (stating an "argument based on the needs of the re-
cording system has no relevance to the original parties to the transaction for which we are
seeking the governing law").
182 Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 465-67 (2010) (arguing property
law is wisely structured so as to avoid the expansion or contraction of the overall package of
rights in a given asset by transferring rights to others).
183 See Whincop & Keyes, supra note 158, at 110 (noting that in transaction between orig-
inal parties "there may be no way of telling that a third party will not become involved"
(emphasis omitted)). The Missouri Supreme Court has expressed general fears of this variety
rather vividly:
Miserable, indeed, would be our property conditions if we left the simple and safe
rules of the common law to run after a will-o'-the-wisp of speculative refinements
said by counsel to spring from comity. All our titles would be drawn within the hazard
of such new doctrine; and, fortunately, even comity calls for no ruling having such
mischief hid in its bowels.
Hughes v. Winkleman, 147 S.W. 994, 997 (Mo. 1912). Having to prove reasonable reliance
on situs law, as some have proposed, only adds to these difficulties. Cf. Richman & Reyn-
olds, supra note 19, at 425-26 (proposing a general test that would apply the law of the state
having the "most significant relationship" with respect to a particular issue to be decided,
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The rule forbidding adjudication of property interests by non-situs
courts is sufficiently unusual and potentially burdensome to require a
few additional comments. Its usefulness in preventing the application of
divergent substantive standards has been noted, but like the first-order
component of the situs rule, it too has other important benefits. For one
thing, it ensures a related kind of uniformity by helping to foreclose the
production of conflicting judgments purporting to resolve the same
property issue. Conflicting judgments undermine property's bottom-line
definitiveness much the way conflicting legal rules do. It is worth noting
that even in situations where multiple courts are competent to handle the
same property issue, there is still a strong push toward exclusivity. In the
context of federal-state relations, for example, the usual rule is that in
areas where federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, a fed-
eral court should neither attempt to prevent a state court from entertain-
ing a matter that duplicates its own pending proceeding nor should it
stay or dismiss the federal litigation in deference to the state-court pro-
ceeding. Yet there is an exception for "in rem" questions-indeed, so
strong is this exception that a state court that has already begun hearing
an in rem action may actually enjoin simultaneous proceedings in feder-
al court requiring jurisdiction over the same res.184 Parallel proceedings
and conflicting judgments are not tolerated. Property law seeks to pro-
vide rights that are definitive and bottom-line, and a property determina-
tion is meant to be correspondingly final.
The prohibition on non-situs adjudications also helps combat infor-
mation-cost problems in a fairly direct way.i"5 Judgments involving
and applying situs law only in exceptional cases where to do otherwise would "disadvantage
a party that relied reasonably" on situs law to conduct a title search). Not only does it intro-
duce uncertainty and a factual inquiry that can be expensive and subjective, but it seems un-
likely to do much good. Actors might well hesitate to rely on situs law knowing that it is
available only as a safety valve for those who do not know better.
184 See Princess Lida of Thum & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 467-68 (1939) (up-
holding state court's decree enjoining litigants from proceeding with suit in federal court).
Actions involving claims to a res is also a foundation for abstention under the Colorado Riv-
er doctrine. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818
(1976); cf. Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Propos-
ing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1347, 1359 (2000) (describing this special rule for in rem cases as "little more than a meta-
physical relic of a very different epistemological age").8 5 In addition, the jurisdictional prohibition offers certain procedural efficiencies if the
situs of property will eventually be called upon to enforce the property rights at issue in the
Property, Exclusivity, Jurisdiction
property issues can be grouped into three basic categories according to
their preclusive consequences: they can bind all people with interests in
the property, they can bind only the parties and their successors in inter-
est, or they can bind the parties and no one else. 186 Binding anyone to the
results of litigation without notice of the proceedings is problematic, and
while the problem may be most acute for strangers, it remains serious
even when only successors are to be precluded. Yet it is black letter law
that successors-in-interest stand in the shoes of those they succeed: They
are entitled to rely on a determination favorable to their predecessors
and, more importantly for our purposes, they are bound by any judgment
against their predecessors-whether or not they knew or reasonably
could have known about it.
87
The basic privity principle reflected in these rules is essential. Again,
making property allocations depend on the identity of the party involved
creates distorting incentives, here on the part of judgment winners to
hold on to property and judgment losers to convey. 188 But this privity
rule also creates serious notice problems. Obtaining information about
prior judgments that could emanate from any court in the country is an
expensive undertaking, and it seems likely that successors might indeed
be ignorant of a relevant determination with some frequency. Yet the
problem is not easily avoided. Conditioning preclusion on actual
knowledge encourages property holders to find unwitting successors and
encourages successors to remain ignorant. If the default were to presume
knowledge, moreover, successors would be put in the difficult position
of having to prove a negative, while if the default were to presume lack
proceeding. See Whincop & Keyes, supra note 158, at 114-15. Since situs courts and situs
officers will inevitably be involved unless the property migrates to another jurisdiction-an
extremely unlikely development where land is concerned-a rule requiring claims to situs
property be brought in situs courts avoids what may generally be expected to be wasteful
proceedings elsewhere.
186 These may be referred to respectively as in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam judg-
ments, although courts do not always use these labels in this manner. See supra notes 31 &
40. This understanding of quasi in rem jurisdiction-the authority to determine property in-
terests in a way binding on successors but not strangers-should not be confused with the
sort of problem presented in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1977), in which it
was argued that the ordinary requirements for personal jurisdiction could be partly avoided
in the context of adjudicating a personal liability by virtue of the presence of the defendant's
property within the adjudicating state.
187 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Judgments § 43 (1982).
188 See Epstein, supra note 182, at 465-67; see also Smith, supra note 28, at 1704.
2014]
Virginia Law Review
of knowledge, challengers would face a serious evidentiary problem in
trying to establish what the successor knew and when he knew it.
An objective reasonableness standard might seem like the way to go,
but what does a reasonable effort look like? Again, a search of all litiga-
tion in all states would be extremely costly. Requiring instead that any
property determination binding on non-parties be made in the courts of
the place where property is located can be seen as a decent proxy for a
reasonableness rule. It lays down a clear legal line that can be appre-
hended ex ante and it reduces the cost of searching by limiting the uni-
verse of information relevant to the property question. The location of
property generally has a fairly strong salience, and it does not seem too
much to ask that claimants to property be willing to appear in the place
where property is physically situated (particularly when it comes to real
property, which will never be situated anyplace else).189 It is notable that
rules channeling litigation into the courts where property is located exist
not only at the interstate but the intrastate level-proceedings are often
restricted not just to the situs state but to the situs county. 190
V. BEYOND BLACKACRE
The arguments developed in Part III drew connections between rights
in rem, the situs rule, and property. This Section takes a brief look at sit-
uations where one of those three elements is missing.
A. Property in Personam
While one state court is generally said to lack jurisdiction over prop-
erty located in another state, there is an important practical qualification
to that statement. A non-situs court is allowed to determine property is-
sues affecting anyone over whom it has personal jurisdiction, so long as
its judgment is only "in personam. ' ' Critics of the situs rule see this
189 It is perhaps noteworthy that the prohibition on adjudicative jurisdiction also appears in
the international context. See British S. Afr. Co. v. Companhia de Mogambique, [1893] A.C.
602 (H.L.) 624 (appeal taken from Eng.).
190 So-called local action rules are state-law requirements that proceedings determining
title to real property be brought in the judicial district where property is located. See June F.
Entman, Abolishing Local Action Rules: A First Step Toward Modernizing Jurisdiction and
Venue in Tennessee, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 251, 253 (2004).
191 See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 8 (1909) ("A court of equity having authority to act upon
the person may indirectly act upon real estate in another State, through the instrumentality of
this authority over the person.").
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apparent exception to the jurisdictional bar as yet another mark against
the situs rule, an accident of history that betrays the lack of principle be-
hind the situs rule's territorialist prohibitions. 192 Yet the distinction can
be understood when some basic concerns of property law are taken into
account.
Standardization and limitation bring not only the benefit of reduced
information costs but also the burden of impeding otherwise desirable
arrangements, 93 and this is as true for the prohibition on non-situs adju-
dications as it is for other restrictions property law imposes. The in per-
sonam exception recognizes that, to the extent it is possible to reduce
notice problems and either avoid any serious risk of nonuniform sub-
stantive standards or to reduce the costs associated with nonuniformity,
there is some room left for action outside the situs. It may be useful to
bring a proceeding in a non-situs court if, for example, money damages
are sought and the situs does not have personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant. Likewise, a non-situs court might need to resolve issues be-
tween claimants to property in the course of some larger determination,
as in a divorce or probate proceeding. 194 The non-situs determination is
purely in personam-it does not affect adverse strangers or successors,
because it is not conceived of as acting upon the property itself-but it
does provide relief between the parties where such relief is needed. 195
Under these circumstances, the limitation on the exercise of non-situs
jurisdiction can sensibly be relaxed. A purely in personam adjudication
does not present the notice problems that arise when non-parties are to
be bound. So long as situs conflicts rules are still used, moreover, uni-
formity should largely be preserved, and since the judgment does not run
to successors, the practical foundation of property's special demand for
uniformity is diminished in any event. Far from runaway conceptualism,
this is formal but practical-an attempt to conform the structures that the
192 See Alden, supra note 19, at 595; see also Nicholas de Belleville Katzenbach, Conflicts
on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law,
65 Yale L.J. 1087, 1139 (1956) ("The oft-repeated statement that a court could exercise no
jurisdiction over foreign land without offense to sovereignty is nonsense; equity did so all
the time for no better reason than that equity acts in personam.").
193 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 61, at 35-38.
194 See Alden, supra note 19, at 599, 604-05.
195 See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Judgments § 43 cmt. a (1982) ("If the action is
characterized as having involved only the 'personal' rights of the litigants, it does not affect
the property itself. The consequence of such a characterization is that a person who subse-




law provides to meet serious needs. It reflects a strategy to promote
change and flexibility while simultaneously preserving structure, conti-
nuity, and stability.
B. Intellectual Property and Intangibles: Property Without Situs
There are a number of situations in which the use of situs law to re-
solve property or property-like questions is either impossible or plainly
undesirable, yet the law tends to recognize the need for uniformity nev-
ertheless. The clearest example is the treatment of intangible property,
where inter-jurisdictional uniformity remains uncommonly common.19 6
The Uniform Commercial Code provides not only conflict-of-laws
rules,197 but also detailed substantive rules for most issues concerning
the transfer of interests in pure intangibles like choses in action, and like
all provisions of the Code, these provisions are uniform from state to
state. 198 Furthermore, the Code's conflicts provisions adopt many of the
strategies for achieving uniformity reflected in the situs rule. The Code
generally refers to situs law where possible, for example, as in the case
of chattel paper and other intangibles reduced to a physical representa-
tion.' 99 It otherwise selects the location (something akin to domicile) of
the debtor, which is probably the next most obvious focal point-
appropriate not because of the regulatory interests of the state where the
debtor is located but because of the salience of the debtor's location as a
touchstone for coordination. The transfer of shares in a corporation,
meanwhile, is generally governed by the conflict-of-laws rules of the
state of incorporation, the corporation's legal "location," and for certifi-
cated securities, the state of incorporation usually looks in turn to the
substantive law of the situs of the certificates at the time of transfer.200
Intellectual property fields are likewise spared the kind of forum-
centric regime produced by the Conflicts Revolution. There is little
room for conflicting laws on subjects of intellectual property like copy-
right and patent since those areas are largely a matter of federal law-in
a sense, one may say they are governed by a situs rule, and their situs is
196 Succession to personal property is another. See supra note 165.
197 See U.C.C. § 9-301 (2012) (choice-of-law provision regarding the perfection and pri-
ority of security interests).
198 All states have enacted the 2000 version of Article 9, although with some individual
variation. See Unif. Commercial Code, 3 U.L.A. 1, 16 (2002).
199 See Weintraub, supra note 19, at 647-51; Kuhn, supra note 43, at 1035-38.
200 See Hay et al., supra note 2, at 1283-84.
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federal territory. 21 There is also a strong judicial dimension to the divi-
sion of authority over intellectual property in the United States. Federal
courts in many cases have exclusive jurisdiction over questions concern-
ing the validity and scope of patents and copyrights, 22 and, moreover,
appellate jurisdiction in patent cases is vested exclusively in the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit-when it comes to patents, even circuit
splits are largely ruled out.203 Regardless of whether these unusual ar-
rangements are ultimately justified, they suggest that the value of uni-
formity in dealing with intellectual property is understood to be particu-
larly strong.
The paramount need for uniformity in dealing with rights in rem and
the extension of the principle to intangible property is evident in the
treatment of escheat questions.0 4 The Supreme Court has in some cir-
cumstances been willing to allow multiple states to tax the same intangi-
ble property205 but it has firmly ruled out the possibility of allowing mul-
201 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006) (copyright provision preempting state law); Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 143-44, 152 (1989) (finding a state
statute preempted by federal patent laws); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976) (expressing congressional
view that "[o]ne of the fundamental purposes" behind the Constitution's Copyright Clause
was to "promote national uniformity" and avoid having authors enforce their rights "under
the differing laws and in the separate courts of the various [s]tates"). Trademark law has a
federal, and thus a nationally uniform, component, but federal jurisdiction is less exclusive
than with copyright and patent. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 414-16 (1964) (opining that "the desirability
of full federal occupation of this nearly occupied field.., can scarcely be doubted").
202 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (Supp. 2012); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d
Cir. 1964); see also Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State
and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 633, 636-38 (1971) (questioning
whether uniformity was part of the original motivation for this exclusivity); Chris J. Katopis,
The Federal Circuit's Forgotten Lessons?: Annealing New Forms of Intellectual Property
Through Consolidated Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev. 581, 583-97 (1999)
(justifying federal court grant of exclusive jurisdiction on uniformity grounds).
203 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006). That the need for uniformity appears to be more strongly
felt in patent than copyright is also suggested by the unwillingness of American courts to
entertain patent claims arising under foreign patent law and to enjoin litigants from proceed-
ing with adjudications of American patents in foreign courts. Neither of these policies has an
analog in copyright. In international patent litigation, in other words, there appears to be a
very strict equivalent of the situs rule's second-order component.2 Escheat of property occurs when a property-holder dies intestate without any legal heirs
or has not claimed property and cannot be located. Rather than allow title to be held in sus-
pense, it transfers to government. See John V. Orth, Escheat: Is the State the Last Heir?, 13
Green Bag 2d 73, 75 (2009).
205 See State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 178 (1942); Curry v. McCanless, 307
U.S. 357, 373 (1939); see also Weintraub, supra note 19, at 711.
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tiple escheats, concluding that one, and only one, state can acquire an
item of intangible property by virtue of escheat.2 °6 Again, the difference
has to do with the conceptual organization of property. Taxation, even
where assessed on the basis of property holding, imposes a kind of per-
sonal liability,2" 7 and as such it can be multiplied: In theory, a person can
be taxed on an item of property at a rate greater than 100%. But escheat
is a transfer of property rights and thus concerns the allocation of rights
in rem. Two states cannot each acquire 100% of a given res, even when
the res is itself an intangible, in personam obligation like a chose in ac-
tion-a figment of the legal imagination.20 8
Texas v. New Jersey, one of the Supreme Court's principal decisions
dealing with the escheat issue, in many respects exemplifies the kind of
reasoning that generally supports the situs rule. The Court's opinion not-
ed that a jurisdictional rule based on physical situs would not work for
intangible property but recognized that exclusivity was the cause, not the
effect, of the situs principle and that therefore some alternative criterion
of allocation would have to be devised.209 It considered, and rejected, a
"most significant contacts" test inspired by a number of landmark Con-
flicts Revolution cases, concluding it would "leave in permanent turmoil
a question which should be settled once and for all by a clear rule.
210
Instead, it decided intangible property should escheat to the state of the
last known address of the creditor, the owner of the debt-res. This had
the advantage not only of entailing a simple and easily determined ques-
tion of fact, but also of being consistent with how the "situs" of intangi-
bles is determined in other legal contexts, of conforming with the basic
idea of property law, and of allocating property among the states in pro-
portion to the commercial activities of their residents. Of course the last
known address might not always turn out to be the creditor's home as of
the time the debt arose or escheated-which governmental interest anal-
206 See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylva-
nia, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443 (1951); see
also Weintraub, supra note 19, at 711 (discussing divergence).
207 Conceptually, that would seem to be what distinguishes it from confiscation.
208 See Weintraub, supra note 19, at 712 ("[O]nce one state has taken all by escheat, there
is nothing left to apportion among other states without taking it out of the hide of the stake-
holder.").
209 See Texas, 379 U.S. at 677.
210 See id. at 678. Indeed, said the Court, it was no test at all, "simply a phrase" calling for
the evaluation of each case on its own peculiar facts, an evaluation that was "difficult," "of-
ten quite subjective," open to the most self-serving interpretations by states, and likely to
generate a high volume of wasteful litigation. Id. at 679.
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ysis might view as necessary to make a state's connection to the creditor
relevant from a policy standpoint. But the Court was untroubled, noting
that such cases would be exceptional and that "any errors thus created, if
indeed they could be called errors, probably will tend to a large extent to
cancel each other out.
2 1
'
The decision recognized property's implicit need for uniformity and
adopted a systemic perspective. It emphasized the need for clarity and
coordination. It made a rough attempt to draw lines in a way that would
allocate material benefits to each state to the extent of the prosperity
they generated. And it resisted the impulse to abandon the project be-
cause its rule would not reach what might arguably be the most correct
result in every individual case if each was examined in isolation from
any other. The decision shows how the outlook that supports the situs
rule for physical property carries even when confronting the esoteric is-
sue of succession to unclaimed, intangible debts.
C. In Remishness Without Property
Strictly speaking, the definition of an in rem entitlement is coexten-
sive with the definition of property-an entitlement that affords some
measure of legal control over a particular thing and is secure against an-
yone else's contrary such entitlement neatly captures property's formal
essence. Nevertheless, a number of legal problems have qualities that in
some ways resemble the features that make property relations in rem.
These are worth examining, not only because they too seem to be ac-
companied by rules tending toward uniformity and exclusivity, but be-
cause they offer further opportunity to reflect on just what it is that
makes a legal problem in rem.
Lawyers commonly have their first encounter with the term "in rem"
in the context of procedural rules, not the classification of substantive
rights, and procedure is an appropriate place to start in looking at in rem-
ness. An in rem entitlement is meant to be secure against the possibility
of anyone else having an entitlement inconsistent with it, and in rem ju-
risdiction allows a court to make a determination providing that security.
It permits a court to declare that no such entitlements exist in a way that
will be effective against anyone asserting such an entitlement. But in
rem jurisdiction so-called is not the only situation in which courts make
determinations of this kind. Something similar can be said about proce-
211 Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
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dural devices like interpleader 2 2 and the "natural ' 213 class actions pro-
vided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), which involve ei-
ther the possibility of potentially conflicting duties or multiple parties
asserting claims upon a limited fund of money. A fairly typical inter-
pleader paradigm is an insurer's obligation to pay several different
claimants whose total claims exceed the insured risk,21" and that obliga-
tion is a res only in a highly abstract sense.2 5 A legal actor's future
course of conduct-the object being fought over in cases where a person
faces a risk of being subjected to conflicting duties-even more so. But
the zero-sum aspect of the issue makes it appropriate to seek a unitary
disposition, not simply because doing so avoids redundancy but because
it is necessary in light of the interrelatedness of the claims.2?1 6 To allow
conflicting judgments in separate proceedings is to replicate at the more
targeted level of those little laws called judgments the same problem of
overlapping, inconsistent norms present when conflicting regimes of
general property law are made simultaneously applicable to the same
property issue.
Notice that, by contrast, merely similar claims of the kind involved in
class actions certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)-
claims that simply share a common legal or factual question-are not as
readily accorded class treatment such as issues lacking in rem interrelat-
edness.2 17 Efficiency, repose, and the need to treat like cases alike offer
some reason for consolidation, but these more prudential considerations
are not as compelling as the need for unitary disposition presented when
claims must be reconciled against one another. The distinction is an im-
212 Fed. R. Civ. P. 22.
213 Norman C. Sabbey, Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. Indus. &
Corn. L. Rev. 539, 542 (1969). These categories bear some resemblance to what were called
"true" and "hybrid" class actions under the original version of Rule 23. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)-(b) (repealed 1966) (allowing class-wide resolution of issues involving "joint, or
common, or secondary [that is, derivative]" rights or "several" rights related to "specific
property"); see also James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems
Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 Geo. L.J. 551, 571-76 (1937).
214 E.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
215 See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1980).
2 16 Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (requiring interpleader where the court cannot afford complete
relief in the absence of interpleader or the person requesting interpleader demonstrates either
an interest in protecting the property at issue or a risk of inconsistent obligations in the ab-
sence of interpleader).
217 It is notable that in these situations, a uniform procedure is often legally required. In
class actions certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), for instance, parties are denied the right
not to participate enjoyed by members of Rule 23(b)(3) classes.
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portant one and one that is too easily overlooked by those seeking to re-
duce in rem relations to a matter merely of numerosity or generality.
Professor Wesley Hohfeld, for example, wrote that a right in rem is "one
of a large class of fundamentally similar yet separate ights... availing
respectively against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class
of people., 218 That description misses something crucial. For a start, by
treating each separate application of what is generally treated as a single
legal relation as a freestanding entitlement, it obscures the idea that there
is a larger, simpler legal principle from which each right-duty pair can
be readily deduced.219 Still more fundamentally, however, Hohfeld's no-
tion that each imaginable interpersonal relationship within the collection
we call property is merely "similar" to all the others fails to account for
the way in which those relations relate to one another. In the true in rem
paradigm, individual right-duty pairs are not just similar; they are pieces
of an integrated system, such that a change to one necessarily risks af-
fecting the others. The special procedural doctrines and devices dis-
cussed here that are designed to deal with such claims under a single ad-
judicative standard reflect this crucial operative difference.220
A propensity toward uniformity can also be seen in a number of areas
of substantive law where something like the idea of in rem-ness is pre-
sent.22' One legal oddity of rather long standing is the practice of classi-
218 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 718 (1917) (emphasis omitted).
219 J.E. Penner similarly writes:
If Hohfeld's description of rights in rem is correct, then whenever Blackacre is trans-
ferred from one person to another, everyone else in the world exchanges one duty for
another. Since rights correlate with duties, when A sells Blackacre to B, all persons
who previously had a duty to A now have a duty to B, since B now has the bundle of
Blackacre rights. The alternative, and I think better, view is that no one's but A's and
B's rights and duties have changed.
Penner, supra note 28, at 23.220 Cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 785 & n.41 (giving standard-form contracts and
class actions, though perhaps only in the fairly unusual situation involving a defendant class,
as possible examples of "compound paucital" relations: legal relationships involving numer-
ous but identified parties).
221 Some fields like estate administration and bankruptcy have fairly obvious similarities to
property and can be viewed as essentially a specialized or modified body of property law.
Not surprisingly, there is a tendency toward uniformity in those areas in terms of both con-
flicts rules and adjudicative procedure. The Constitution, for instance, gives Congress the
power to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. This Congress has done, in the form of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006). The Code not only provides nationally uniform
bankruptcy law but also looks to state law where relevant in order to ensure uniform treat-
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fying questions of personal status, like marriage and legitimacy, as "in
rem" matters.2 While marriage, for example, has property law implica-
tions, it seems quite peculiar to say that a marriage itself is an object to
be chopped up and distributed among the universe of possible claimants.
Yet on further reflection, the analytical similarity to property may be
greater than first appears, although the connection does not necessarily
have to do with rights in assets. Marriage has effects on the world inas-
much as a marriage between A and B precludes a marriage between A
and C-at the risk of potentially serious penalties.2 3 It is as though each
person were born with a sort of imaginary object whose possession by
ment of the same legal relationship as between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy proceedings,
see Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), and the authority for the view that the
rules for deciding which state's law to incorporate should not depend on the forum, see
Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 162 (1946); Woods-Tucker
Leasing Corp. of Ga. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1981). But
see In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2001). Bankruptcy adjudication is also
restricted: Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over "cases under" the Code, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a) (2006), and the particular court in which a case is filed or pending has exclusive
jurisdiction over "all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement
of such case, and of property of the estate." Id. § 1334(e).
Other property-like areas involve the conversion of certain activities into intangible things
that are administered by specialized bodies, sometimes public and sometimes private.
Broadcast spectrum-what might be thought of as the right to emit electromagnetic radiation
at a given frequency-is administered by the Federal Communications Commission. Tele-
phone numbers in the United States are allocated among telephone service providers accord-
ing to the North American Numbering Plan Administration, which is administered by
Neustar, Inc., and providers in turn assign individual numbers to their customers. The Inter-
net domain-name system is managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, or ICANN. See ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (Oct.
24, 1999), http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/policy; see also Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) (2006) (establishing an "in rem civil action
against a domain name" in federal court to establish priority of a trademark holder to a do-
main name employing the mark). In any of these situations, it would clearly be undesirable
to have conflicting regimes in place for the distribution of the hypothesized res. Telephone
networks, for instance, could hardly operate if one protocol meant that dialing a particular
number would cause one person's telephone to ring while other equally applicable protocols
meant the same number would connect the dialer with someone else. See Karl M. Manheim
& Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy, 25 Hastings Comm.
& Ent. L.J. 359, 401 (2003).
222 See Ray v. Ray, 217 N.W.2d 492, 494 (Minn. 1974) ("A custody proceeding is in the
nature of an action in rem, the child's status being the res."); see also Unif. Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act § 12, 9 U.L.A. 274 (1988) (stating that there is no requirement for technical
personal jurisdiction since custody determinations are proceedings in rem or proceedings
affecting status).
223 Actually, marriage is zero-sum even if polygamy is allowed inasmuch as B might have
an interest in preventing C from also becoming A's spouse.
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another transforms the possessor into something called a spouse. We
may not think of marriage in quite this way, but the rules that govern it
can be mapped onto this allocational structure. Pace Hohfeld, the inter-
relatedness of claims that this structure implies gets quite close to the
core of rights in rem as a legal category.224 And notably, conflict-of-laws
rules concerning the validity of a marriage are generally single-factor,
bright-line, and uniform-largely unaffected by the Conflicts Revolu-
tion.225 Jurisdiction to terminate a marriage by divorce is curtailed,
moreover,226 and the validity of a divorce decree was the only issue out-
side the context of property for which renvoi was tolerated in the era of
the First Restatement.227 The property parallels are strong.
Corporate law also involves one of the few First Restatement doc-
trines to survive the Conflicts Revolution largely intact. The principle
that the law of the state of incorporation governs many of the major is-
sues in the law of corporations continues to dominate American law.228
Here, too, there are aspects of in rem-ness. Shareholding in important
respects corresponds with a conception of corporate ownership,229 and
224 The same can be said of legitimacy. Sibling rivalry, for instance, attests to the potential-
ly zero-sum nature of such family relations.
225 See Hay et al., supra note 2, at 620 (stating that "the courts of the United States tradi-
tionally have applied a single choice-of-law reference to the place of celebration for the de-
termination of issues relating to marriage"). The validity of marriage may be distinguished
from the incidents of marriage, which does not implicate zero-sum considerations in the
same way. The so-called public policy exception, which permits non-recognition of marriag-
es thought to be repugnant to local mores, is also not necessarily inconsistent with the thesis
advanced here to the extent non-recognition is limited to the forum.
226 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 72 (1971); see also Rice v. Rice, 336
U.S. 674, 674 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
227 See 1 Beale, supra note 64, at 57-58.
228 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 303 (identity of shareholders); id.
§§ 303-310 (shareholder rights inter se, officer and director fiduciary duties, and other inter-
nal governance questions); id. § 307 (shareholder liability to corporate creditors); see also
Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Explanations
for Its Continued Primacy, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1480, 1481 (2002) (reflecting upon "how truly
remarkable it is that most states voluntarily adhere to the internal affairs doctrine"). There
have been some attempts by states to limit this general rule. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code
§ 2115(a) (Deering 2009). On possible conflict between such "pseudo-foreign corporations"
laws and the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982),
see Hay et al., supra note 2, at 1410-11. The place-of-incorporation principle has in some
instances been accompanied by something similar to the situs rule's second-order compo-
nent. Id. at 1283-84, 1405-06 (noting use of conflicts rules of state of incorporation in con-
nection with transfer of shares and discussing judicial jurisdiction over foreign corporations).
229 It is associated with residual claims on the assets of a corporation, a right to the fruits of
the corporation's endeavors and improvements, and control over the ways the corporation is
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 100:111
since it is therefore zero-sum in the sense that no one can hold 130% of
a company's stock, a single ultimate standard is needed to determine
who owns what shares.23 ° The "internal affairs" of a corporation-voting
rules, fiduciary duties, and so on-are likewise zero-sum inasmuch as
they have the potential to generate mutually exclusive legal demands if
not administered on a unitary basis according to a single standard."'
And whatever their content, rules concerning the personal liability of
shareholders to corporate creditors (that is, limited liability) and the
availability of corporate assets for the satisfaction of shareholder liabili-
ties ought to apply the same way to all shareholders, given the interde-
pendence of their relationship.232 Rules limiting liability in these ways,
moreover, can be seen as strategies for "modularizing" the corporation
so as to minimize the information relevant to potential creditors and in-
vestors through the creation of partitioned groups of assets with stand-
ardized features.23 3 In a sense, they are ways of delineating the bounda-
put to use-on a good-against-the-world basis. But see Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 290 (1980) (stating that from a "'nexus of
contracts' perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept").23 0 Authority over the partitioning of the corporate res can itself be subdivided and dele-
gated, insofar as the place of incorporation can use another state's law to resolve issues con-
cerning particular issues pertaining to particular allocations-paralleling the second-order
component of the situs rule. For example, the place of incorporation can decide who inherits
a shareholder's shares by using the law applicable to the division of the shareholder's estate
or by looking to the place where share certificates are located. But the place of incorporation
is the starting point because ultimately there must be a final sort of registry to coordinate
these disparate sorts of determinations. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. The par-
titioning process takes place along a slightly different dimension under the "indirect holding"
system established under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 8-
503(d)-(e) (2012); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting,
96 Geo. L.J. 1227, 1242 (2008) (explaining that under Article 8, "the interest of the custom-
ers who hold a certain security is not an interest in any particular item of property, but rather
is a pro rata interest in all like securities of the intermediary held in common by all other cus-
tomers who own the same security").
231 Cf. William S. Lerach, Securities Class Actions and Derivative Litigation Involving
Public Companies: One Plaintiff's Perspective, in 399 Practising L. Inst., Litigation and
Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series 65, 99-107 (1990) (asserting that the "only
argument in favor of the internal affairs doctrine boils down to having the state of incorpora-
tion's own law applied to promote uniformity and predictability" and that such concerns are
insufficient to justify the doctrine after the Conflicts Revolution).
232 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302 cmt. e ("Uniform treatment of di-
rectors, officers and shareholders is an important objective which can only be attained by
having the rights and liabilities of those persons with respect to the corporation governed by
a single law.").
233 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 Yale L.J. 387, 390 (2000). Once again, Wesley Hohfeld thought otherwise, since he per-
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ries of the corporate res, the kind of allocational process at the heart of
property law. By way of an illustrative contrast, the liability of the cor-
poration itself for the acts of a putative agent is determined by ordinary
conflicts rules, which do not evince any special concern for uniformi-
ty.234 Unlike the distribution of shareholder and corporate assets, the
corporation's dealings with individual creditors does not present the
same essential need for a uniform rule, even if uniformity might offer
some benefits by providing greater clarity or certainty.
The principles noted here may even have constitutional implications.
Today, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is said to require one state to
apply another's law in some circumstances. Scholars, however, debate
whether that is a correct reading of the original meaning of the Clause,
and in fact, the Supreme Court does not appear actually to have held as
much until well into the twentieth century.235 Rather suggestively, the
Court's earliest uses of Full Faith and Credit to require the application of
another state's law were in two sorts of cases: those concerning the lia-
bility of corporate shareholders, 36 the issue just discussed, and those
concerning fraternal benefit societies237-insurance cooperatives, in es-
sence, in which member-owners contributed to a common fund to com-
pensate fellow members who had been injured or killed.238 In the context
ceived the thing-ness or personification of corporations as analytical error, and argued
against universal application of the law of the incorporating state to such questions. See
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Individual Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of
Laws, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 283, 296 (1910); see also Currie, supra note 22, at 346 & n.248
(citing Hohfeld approvingly).
234 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 301.
235 See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Discrimination and Full
Faith and Credit, 63 Emory L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=2054645.
236 See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 637-39 (1935); see also Converse v. Hamilton,
224 U.S. 243, 261 (1912).
237 See Order of United Comm. Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Sover-
eign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 72 (1938); Modem Wood-
men of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v.
Green, 237 U.S. 531, 532 (1915).
238 These societies often operated under an assessment system, meaning that members con-
tributed as individual claims arose, in order to relieve the society of the need to maintain a
large reserve fund. See John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident
Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 690, 803 (2001); see also id. (noting the importance placed upon assessing all members
in equal amounts). As with rules for determining the extent to which shareholders are liable
for corporate debts (and vice versa), this structure is centered on a question of asset-
partitioning, which is to say a problem of in rem-ness. See supra note 233.
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of these latter cases the Court remarked that membership in such a coop-
erative society is "something more than a contract;" it is a "complex and
abiding relation, and as marriage looks to domicil, membership looks to
and must be governed by the law of the [S]tate granting the incorpora-
tion. ' Regardless of whether the Court was correct in its reading of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, the strongest case for the application of
one state's laws by another seems to have been presented in cases con-
cerning rights of an in rem quality.24°
CONCLUSION
This Article has both drawn upon and sought to reinforce the growing
recognition of the distinctness of property's analytical form. Understood
as a regime for the allocation of control over resources, in which rights
in rem necessarily come at the expense of everyone else, property is a
system at once complex, authoritative, and fundamental. Its zero-sum
design makes an especially strong demand for uniform conflict-of-laws
rules from state to state, both because of the toll non-uniformity takes on
the allocation-based concepts used to structure property law and because
of the difficulties actors face in communicating and acquiring the infor-
mation made relevant to them by the in rem entitlements such a system
produces.
The situs rule is justified not because the state where an item of prop-
erty is located has a superior claim to have its property law applied per
se, but because the situs rule creates a clear focal point that facilitates
uniformity, helping ensure that only one legal regime will be used to de-
termine any given question concerning the distribution of property rights
in a given asset. In short, if the "land taboo" is anachronistic, the anach-
ronism lies not in its content but in its name, suffused as it is with the
once-fashionable notions of mid-twentieth-century psychoanalysis and
the conceited presentism of a present now very much a part of the
239 Modern Woodmen, 267 U.S. at 551.
240 These cases are examined in Weintraub, supra note 19, at 697-705; Larry E. Ribstein &
Erin Ann O'Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 661, 716; Rob-
ert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of Constitution-
al Generalism, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 59, 99-100 (1981); James Y. Stem, Note, Choice of Law,
the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1509, 1528 (2008); Woolhandler & Collins,
supra note 235; Clyde Spillenger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality, and the Constitutional-




past.24 ' Far from an obsolete relic from a bygone legal era, the situs rule
represents a sensible response to issues that play a central role in some
of today's most innovative private law scholarship and points the way
forward in future thinking about questions of both property and jurisdic-
tion.
241 See Lawrence K. Frank, An Institutional Analysis of the Law, 24 Colum. L. Rev. 480,
481 (1924) (describing institution of private property as a reflection of "taboo").
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